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JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM* AND JOE F. ASHER**
The notion that American municipalities have an inherent right
to local self-government has never made more than slight inroads
upon the strongly prevailing doctrine of legislative supremacy
over local government.' Even that vigorous judicial champion of
municipal home rule in Ohio, Judge Wanamaker, readily conceded
that prior to November 15, 1912, the effective date of the so-called
"Home Rule Amendment," legislative supremacy obtained in this
state.
2
The Ohio story of abuse of legislative power over municipal
government has already been told in the pages of this number of
the Journal.3 In 1902 the Supreme Court put an end to evasion of
the constitutional ban upon special chartering of municipalities
by resort to artificial classification based on population. During the
ten years which followed, a well-chastened General Assembly
showed no disposition to resort further to evasive tactics. It failed,
however, to provide any flexibility in municipal governmental or-
ganization. The municipal code of 1902 provided but one form of
government for municipalities of 5,000 or over and but one for
those -of less than 5,000. Urban leaders were no longer satisfied,
moreover, to depend upon legislative grace for the authority to do
*Dean and Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State Uni-
versity.
**Member of the staff of the Attorney General of Ohio; formerly Re-
search Assistant, College of Law, The Ohio State University. Opinions ex-
pressed in this paper are those of the authors as individuals.
1McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government,
16 COL. L. REV. 190, 299 (1916). The inherent right concept has been as-
serted most often with respect to the selection of local officers but it has
cropped .up in other situations. See City of Lexington v. Thompson, 113
Ky. 540, 68 S.W. 477 (1902) (statute fixing the pay of members of a city
fire department declared invalid); State of Montana ex rel. Kern v. Arnold,
100 Mont. 346, 49 P. 2d 976 (1935) (statute requiring a three-platoon fire
department invalidated).
There was an assertion of a vague transcendental concept of county
self-government in State ex rel. v. Commissioners, 54 Ohio St. 333, 43,
N.E. 587 (1896), but it was not necessary to the disposition of the case
and found its only rational support in a widely-repudiated pronouncement
by Judge Cooley.
'State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 89 Ohio St. 71, 125, 131,'102 N.E. 670,
681, 683 (1913) (dissenting opinion).
'Walker, Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912; 9 OHIx6 ST.
L.J. 1 (1948).
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whatever was deemed necessary in the conduct of what they con-
sidered local business. They wanted the legal situation reversed so
that the municipalities would have all powers not denied instead
of only those positively granted by the legislature.
4
The upshot was a constitutional amendment which made a
direct grant of substantive powers to municipalities and provided
for three different methods of organizing municipal government:
(1) incorporation and operation under a uniform general law, (2)
local option under an optional charter law and (3) local framing
and adoption of a home rule charter.
The constitutions of twenty-one states make some sort of pro-
vision for municipal home rule.5 Where the grant of charter-making
powers comes directly from the constitution it is called constitu-
tional home rule. Ohio and a number of other states are committed
to constitutional home rule. If enabling legislation is necessary to
render home rule powers available what we have is legislative
home rule. Examples of this type are to be found in Michigan,
Texas and West Virginia. Neither form gives positive assurance
of genuine local autonomy. There may be more local responsibility
and freedom of action under a devolution of authority from a
liberally-disposed legislature than under a scheme of constitutional
home rule. Much will depend upon the fate of the constitutional
grant in the courts as well as the original scope of the grant.
The Ohio home rule pattern is distinctive in two conspicuous
respects. Although Article XVIII classifies municipalities under
5,000 as villages and the rest as cities, home rule powers are granted
to all municipalities alike, regardless of size." While it is true that
'See the remarks of Delegate Knight, 2 Proceedings and Debates, Ohio
Constitutional Convention 1912, 1433 (hereinafter referred to as "De-
bates").
5ARiz. CONST. Art. XIII, §§2 and 3; CALIF. CONST. Art. XI, §6 et seq.;
CoLo. CONST. Art. XX, §§1-6; LA. CONST. Art. XIV, §3 (a) (As to East Baton
Rouge Parish and the City of Baton Rouge only); ID. CoNsT. Art. XI A
(as to Baltimore only); MicH. CoNST. Art. VIII, §2 et seq.; MnxN. CoNsT.
Art. IV, §36; Mo. CONST. Art. VI, §§19 and 20; NFr. CONST. Art. XI, §§2-5;
NEV. CoNsT. Art. VIII, §8; N. Y. CONST. Art. IX, §§9, 11-13; Omo CoNsT.
Art. XVII; OKLA. CONST. Art. XVIII, §§2-7; ORE. CONST. Art. XI, §§2 and
2-a; PA. CoNsT. Art. XV, §1; TEX. CONsT. Art. XI, §5; UTAH CONST. Art. XI,
§5; WASH. CONST. Art XI, §§10 and 11; W. VA. CONST. Art. VI, §39-(a). A
new Article XV, captioned "Home Rule," was made a part of the Georgia
Constitution in 1945. Actually, it provides for optional Charters, not home
rule. Virginia has a procedure for local framing and adoption in any city
of 50,000 or more of a special charter or form of government to be sub-
mitted to the General Assembly for its consideration. See VA. CONST. §117
and Va. Acts. 1946, c. 122. This is improved special chartering, not
home rule.
'There are a few other states which set no population minimum.
Among these are Minnesota, Oregon and the relatively recent convert,
Utah.
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metropolitan problems have come to the medium-sized city and
thus have broadened the need for greater flexibility in both the
organization and powers of municipal government, the larger urban
centers have always been the strongholds of the home rule move-
ment.7 Those centers have suffered most at the hands of the legis-
latures and, at the same time, they have had more complex special
problems not readily dealt with under a system of uniform general
laws. It is not without significance that only four of the more than
700 villages in Ohio have adopted home rule charters. All save
Canton of Ohio's twelve largest cities, on the other hand, have
exercised the power. A total of thirty-three of the 115 cities in the
state have home rule charters. The need for this authority, at the
village level, at least, is not apparent.
In Ohio substantive home rule powers are granted directly by
the constitution to all municipalities and do not depend, for their
realization, upon the adoption of a home rule charter. This does
violence to that basic "axiom of home rule," as Professor McBain
put it, "that the grant of substantive powers must not be separated
from the adjective process prescribed for the exercise of such
powers."8 The draftsmen of Article XVIII had not been clear on
this point. Section 3 grants all powers of local self-government to
"municipalities." Such powers doubtless embrace many things com-
monly placed in executive or administrative hands. The local
legislative body was not the "municipality." Charter-making was
the only process available for the "municipality" to determine who
would exercise this or that power of local self-government. In
view of these considerations it is not surprising that a majority
of the Supreme Court, in the first case under the amendment,
interpreted it to make the availability of substantive powers of
local self-government depend upon the adoption of a home rule
charter.9 This construction was not to survive. It was ignored in
1917 in a case involving a local police regulation, a matter obviously
appropriate for action by the legislative body of the local unit as
distinguished from its other agencies and officers.10 Six years later
it was flatly rejected for the view, which has ever since prevailed,
that the grant of Section 3 is direct and independent of charter-
making."
'So it was in Missouri, the cradle of home rule, when, in 1875, a con-
stitutional provision, designed to free St. Louis from domination by the
small town and rural interests in the legislature, was adopted.
'McBAiN, THE LAW AD THE PRACTICE Or MUNI CIPAL HOME RULE 669
(1916).
'State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, supra note 2.
"City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
The Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E.
595 (1923).
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This brings us to a question of fundamental importance, which
has never been decisively dealt with by the courts. If, upon the
adoption of Article XVIII, all municipalities were immediately
endowed with all powers of local self-government, was not the
General Assembly simultaneously excluded from the area? In
other words, was not local jurisdiction so far exclusive that the
legislature could not occupy the field even though a particular
municipality had not acted? A strong argument can be made for
the exclusive jurisdiction theory. It can be said that the people
organized the very state itself and that they could parcel out gov-
ernmental power as between the state and municipalities as they
saw fit. By giving the latter all powers of local self-government
they saw fit to make each municipality, to that extent, an imperium
in imperio. The practical consequences of applying that theory
are, however, so serious that it is not to be accepted lightly. Any
provision of the municipal code having to do with anything within
the sweep of local self-government would simply be invalid. The
state's numerous villages are wont to be guided by the statute law
as they find it. The municipal code is the charter of those which
have not adopted either an optional or a home rule charter. It
would be quite too much to expect of every tiny village that it draw
for itself the line marking the limits of "all powers of local self-
government", when it is perfectly apparent that the General As-
sembly has not and could not reliably do so.
A possible key to the problem is, we believe, to be fohnd in
Section 2 of Article XVII. It requires general laws for the in-
corporation and government of municipalities. Must we say that
"government" was used narrowly to denote mere form or struc-
ture? Is it not less strained to assume that the term covers powers
and procedures as well as structure? Certainly "self-government"
in Section 3 embraces substantive powers. Under the normal
home rule pattern envisioned by MeBain substantive powers would
be made available by charter-making. In Ohio, Sections 2 and 3
can be read together and the theory developed that the scheme of
governmental structure, powers and procedure established under
Section 2 would obtain in any municipality until departed from by
an appropriate exercise of the home rule powers conferred by
Sections 3 and 7.12
"Clearly, Article X, relating to county and township government,
ties the availability of substantive home rule powers to charter-making.
County "organization and government" must be provided for by general
law and charter-making does not effect the realization of substantive
powers unless it involves the vesting of municipal powers in a county.
As used here it is perfectly plain that "government" embraces powers as
well as structure and procedure. It should be noted that county home rule
is-a dead letter in Ohio. See Howland v. Krause, 130 Ohio St. 455, 200
19481
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As the home rule proposal originally appeared in the Conven-
tion, Section 3 read:
"Municipalities shall have the power to enact and
enforce within their limits, such local police, sanitary and
other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws affecting the welfare of the state as a whole; and no
such regulations shall by reason of requirements therein,
in addition to those fixed by law, be deemed in conflict
therewith unless the general assembly, by general law,
affecting the welfare of the state as a whole, shall specifi-
cally deny all municipalities the right to act thereon."
The portion following the words "general laws" was stricken
after much debate as to whether their presence would assure the
municipalities greater authority in dealing with the liquor ques-
tion.13 The proponents of home rule were unhappy over this action
because they thought it left ultimate control in the legislature as
to matters of local concern since laws general in form and applica-
ion could be enacted on such subjects. Professor Knight, accord-
ingly, offered an amendment which cast Section 3 into its present
language except for a comma after "self-government." This was
adopted. At that stage of the game Section 7 granted charter-
making power subject to the limitation "but all such charters and
powers shall be subject to general laws affecting the welfare of the
state as a whole." Mr. Knight thought his amendment would put
charter and non-charter units on a like footing but he significantly
declared the effect would be to leave both with powers of local
self-government "subject to general laws."'" In order to conform
Section 7 more closely to the changed Section 3 Delegate Winn
offered an amendment, which was adopted and which recast Sec-
tion 7 into its present form. When the entire proposal was adopted
the comma after "self-government" had somehow disappeared.15
Later Delegate FitzSimons offered an amendment to restore the
comma on the ground that it would make it clearer that the "pow-
ers were entirely within the municipality."'( Mr. Winn opposed
this amendment with the following significant argument:
"A few days ago, when this question was under dis-
cussion, I offered an amendment to section 7 broader in its
scope and more liberal to the municipalities than anything
that has been asked for by the author of the proposal or
by its friends. That amendment was offered and agreed to
and written into the proposal because in section 3 there
N.E. 512 (1936), discussed in 2 OHIO ST. L.J. 309 (1936) and by S. Gale
Lowrie in Interpretation of the County Home Rule Amendment by the Ohio
Supreme Court, 10 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 454 (1936).
'2 Debates 1463 et seq. The original section was attempted-to be re-
produced in full at only one point in the Debates. See 2 Debates 1465. The
omission in that quotation of the words "are not in conflict with general
laws affecting" may, with confidence, be taken as an inadvertence.
" Id. at 1485. "Id. at 1496. " Id. at 1860.
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was no comma after the word self-government. You see the
importance of all this, so if we now insert a comma after
the word "self-government" and thereby limit the right of
municipalities by general laws to only such things as relate
-to local police, sanitary and other regulations, then we
have in section 7 the same unrestricted right on the part
of the municipalities to adopt a charter that was not in-
tended. Such was not understood to be the sense of this
Convention when the amendment to section 7, was offered
and adopted. It ought not to be allowed now. I think that
the members in favor of this proposal should have known
before this section was presented that those who are op-
posed to it yielded, as we did a few days ago, simply be-
cause we believed there was left in it local self-government
for municipalities limited only by the provisions of the
general assembly or the lawmaking power. I move, there-
fore, that this amendment be laid on the table."
The motion to table prevailed. While Mr. Winn appears to
have been mistaken in saying that there was no comma after "self-
government" in Section 3 when he proposed an amendment to
Section 7 a few days before, there is scant basis for doubt that the
Convention accepted his argument here.
In its address to the people, which supported each proposed
amendment with a brief explanation, the Convention ignored Sec-
tion 3.17 It described the three ways a municipality could deter-
mine its form of government but said nothing about the substantive
grants of Section 3. The published commentary of a contemporary
writer, who strongly opposed the amendment, is particularly inter-
esting at this point. He wrote:
"Section 7 provides that: 'Any municipality may frame
and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may,
subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this article, exercise
thereunder all powers of local self-government.' Section 3
specifically states that: 'Municipalities shall have authority
to exercise all powers of local self-government ... as are
not in conflict with general laws.' Therefore, the power
granted in section 7 to 'frame and adopt or amend a charter'
is a grant of power to frame and adopt or amend a charter
not in conflict with general laws."'8
There is a rather compelling point which supports this interpreta-
tion. If Section 7 were not so interpreted the words "subject to the
provisions of Section 3 of this article" would be rendered meaning-
less for, unless that section's grant of powers of local self-govern-
ment is qualified by the non-conflict clause, there would be no
'The Proceedings and Debates of the Convention do not show this
part of the Address in final form. See 2 Debates 2052. It was reproduced
on page 111 of a contemporary pamphlet, published by the Stoneman
Press, Columbus, Ohio, and entitled "Proposed Amendments to the Con-
stitution of Ohio."
'See the pamphlet cited in note 17, at p. 113.
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limitation in Section 3 to which the quoted words could have
reference. To say that the reference is to a limitation upon the
second grant of Section 3 would do violence to the language used
since Section 7 uses the wording of the first grant of Section 319
Section 3, moreover, is not to be read one way for charter munici-
palities and another for the rest.
Judge Wanamaker thought the first grant of Section 3 related
to municipal power and was unlimited; that the second related to
state power and was limited. "The second half," he said, "could not
possibly relate to municipal power, because the first half is as
comprehensive as a grant of power could be and therefore, no
addition could be made to it.''2° This ignores both the considera-
tions mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the improvisation
indulged in casting Section 3 in its final form. The local self-gov-
ernment verbiage was an interpolation and it is far from plain
that an unqualified grant of power was contemplated. Actually,
moreover, the two grants do appear to overlap; surely some local
police and sanitary regulations would, as an original matter, be
said to lie within the ambit of local self-government. It is obvious
that those who produced the original draft of Section 3 thought so.21
There is a familiar argument that unless the municipalities
were made supreme in all matters of purely self-government "there
would have been no purpose in adopting the amendment." 22 This
is to put the matter a little strongly. Professor Knight pointed out
in the Convention that it was desired to reverse the prevailing rule
that municipalities have only such powers as the legislature has
devolved upon them, so that by direct constitutional grant they
would have "the power to do those things which are not pro-
hibited." Surely that would be a substantial purpose even though
legislative supremacy were not broken.
"In State ex Tel. Giovanello v. Village of Lowellville, 139 Ohio St. 219,
39 N.E. 2d 527 (1942), Judge Williams assumed that the words "subject
to the provisions of Section 3 of this article," which appear in Section 7,
had reference to the limitations upon the second grant of Section 3. He
did not explain how this could be when Section 7 speaks of powers of
local self-government but does not mention local police, and the like,
regulations.
'Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 362, 365, 103 N.E. 512, 518,
519 (1913).
"See the original language of Section 3, quoted on page 22. In the
cases we find attempts to explain the existence of the non-conffict clause
as a limitation upon only the second grant of Section 3 on the ground that
"local self-government" refers to matters of a "purely local nature"
whereas police, sanitary and other regulations were not "purely" local
matters. See State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 578, 53 N.E.
2d 501, 504 (1944).
'See Williams, J., concurring in State, ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142
Ohio St. 574, 586, 587, 53 N.E. 2d 501, 507, 508 (1944).
[Vol. 9
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While the courts have not always clearly observed- the dis-
tinction, it is plain enough that the Supreme Court is committed
to the view that the non-conflict clause qualifies only the second
grant of Section 3.23 The reader is asked to bear in mind that the
discussion which follows is conditioned by this basic judicial ap-
proach to the subject.
Every attempt in the Convention to define home rule powers
in such terms as "municipal affairs" met with defeat. The sponsor-
ing delegates had been told about the unhappy history of the term
"municipal affairs" in the interpretation of the California home
rule provision.24 They wanted to avoid vague language which
would dump political problems as to allocation of governmental
powers into the laps of the courts. Yet, with childlike faith, they
uncritically seized upon the term "local self-government," language
which is not one whit more helpful in marking the bounds of mu-
nicipal authority. One can, of course, dig into the reports and see
how the term has been applied in particular cases. We find, how-
ever, that this experience has enabled the courts to make no more
helpful generalization than that the reference is to matters of a
"purely local nature."25 The word "purely" adds little, if anything.
It does not convert grey into either black or white. As the ex-
pression of a broad political idea, either the California or the Ohio
term carries considerable meaning, but, as a legal concept, "local
self-government" is as lacking in sharpness of meaning, after thirty-
five years of interpretation, as it was at the outset. It has been a
fundamental difficulty with the home rule concept from the be-
ginning that public affairs are not inherently either local or general
in nature. This being so, it is mere self-deception to parade the old
girl in a different dress.
When we come to the second grant of Section 3 we run afoul,
at once, the terms "conflict" and "general laws." The obvious in-
quiry as to the latter is whether it refers to generality of applica-
tion or of subject matter or both. In Froelich v. City of Cleveland,2
= The confusion has arisen in the lower courts. Even in cases which
have drawn heavy fire from devotees of home rule the Supreme Court
has made it plain that the non-conflict clause does not qualify the first
grant of Section 3. See State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 578,
53 N.E. 2d 501, 504 (1944).
'2 Debates 1485, 1488. Concerning the California experience McBain
very aptly quoted the following language from an opinion of Judge Mc-
Farland of the California Supreme Court: "The section of the constitution
in question uses the loose, indefinable, wild words municipal affairs, and
imposes upon the court the almost impossible duty of saying what they
mean." Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 213, 214, 74 Pac. 780, 784 (1903);
quoted in McBAix, THE LAW AND THE PRAcTicE OF MUNCIPAL HOME RULE.
279 (1916).
' See note 21 supra. ' 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
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the Supreme Court declared, in substance, that general laws are
those which apply uniformly throughout the state and that they
are enactments which are of general concern to the state as a
whole. It was not made clear that these were two dependent ele-
ments in a single definition. Since, as we have already seen, the
Convention struck out a clause which would have expressly
written the second meaning into the section, "general laws" should
be taken to refer simply to measures general in application. 7 If,
on the other hand, the word "local" was used in Section 3 in the
sense of application it would be redundant because municipal regu-
lations would necessarily be local in operative effect.
The prevailing test of "conflict" was spelled out in the case of
Village of Struthers v. Sokol.28 In that case the court adopted the
"head-on clash" theory. Conflict exists when "the ordinance de-
clares something to be right which the state law declares to be
wrong, or vice versa. There can be no conflict unless one authority
grants a permit or license to do an act which is forbidden or pro-
hibited by the other." 9 Mere inconsistency is not enough. Such a
formula is difficult to apply in many situations, and, as we shall
see, there have been cases in which it appeared that the principle
itself was shaken, if not abandoned.
A statute placing limitations upon municipal powers may be
a law of general application but, with the possible exception of the
borrowing power, 0 the grants of Section 3 cannot be defeated that
' "In Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which empowers
municipalities to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws, the words 'general laws' refer to laws passed by the legislature
which are of general application throughout the state." Paragraph 2 of
the syllabus in Leis v. The Cleveland Railway Co., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128
N.E. 73 (1920).
M108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923). The cases down to 1942 are
discussed by Hitchcock, Ohio Ordinances in Conflict with General Laws,
16 U. OF Cix. L. REV. 1 (1942).
Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 268, 140 N.E. 519, 521
(1923).
' Section 13 of Article XVIII authorizes the enactment of laws limit-
ing the power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts. Prior to
1912 the ground had been covered by Section 6, Article XIII. That Section
was not repealed; the home rule grant was new and the draftsmen merely
chose the course of putting another tax and debt limit provision in the
Home Rule Amendment. That it was deemed necessary to confer this
authority on the General Assembly in express terms suggests strongly that
Section 3 devolved taxing and borrowing power upon municipalities.
[Vol. 9
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way. True "conflict" arises when the legislature has legislated
directly on the subject, not when it merely forbids municipal
action.31
GOVERNIENTAL STRUCTURE
Home rule powers are conferred upon municipalities. That
means municipal corporations already duly incorporated. Original
incorporation under a home rule charter is not possible. The
scheme of Article XVIII is that a municipality shall be brought
into being under general law. Once in esse it may continue with
the form of organization provided by the general law (municipal
code), or it may, by local option, shift to any one of several forms
made. available by an optional charter law;32 or it -may frame and
adopt a home rule charter. An optional charter municipality may
adopt a home rule charter but the converse is not true. Once a
home rule charter has been adopted it can be amended as provided
in Article XVIII but the municipality cannot thereafter shift under
the statute to an optional plan.33
The Home Rule Amendment deals expressly with charter-
making and amendment but is silent as to the repeal or abolition
of a charter. The Constitution does reserve to the people of each
municipality the initiative and referendum powers on questions
which the municipality might then or thereafter be authorized by
law to control by legislative action.3, It would be rather anomalous
if home rule went so far as to permit adoption or amendment of a
charter but stopped short of permitting return to a pre-charter
status. The court, accordingly, in Youngstown v. Craver,-5 quite
frankly was "casting about" for a rationalization, when it upheld
resort to initiative and referendum as a means of abandoning a
.power. Assuming that matters of procedure in borrowing money to finance
a city hall, for example, were within the realm of local self-government,
on what basis could the General Assembly claim the final word except as
to procedure calculated to implement a tax or debt limitation? This dis-
tinction was clearly recognized in State ex rel. Hile v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio
App. 265, 160 N.E. 241 (1927).
General statutes governing special assessment proceedings have been
held to override conflicting charter provisions on authority of Section 6, Ar-
ticle XIII, of the Constitution. State ex rel. Osborne v. Williams, 111 Ohio
St. 400, 145 N.E. 542 (1924); Berry v. City of Columbus, 104 Ohio St. 607,
136.N.E. 824 (1922).
With respect to the issuance of general obligation municipal bonds to
finance municipal public utilities see State ex rel. Toledo v. Weiler, 101
Ohio St. 123, 128 N.E. 88 (1920),
"See City of Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844
(1929); City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
OHIO GEN. CODE §3515-1 et seq.
Switzer v.-State ex rel. Silvey,. 103 Ohio St. 306, 133 1.E. 552 (1921).
bHIo CONST. Art. II, §lf.
'127 Ohio St., 195, 187 N.E. 715 (1933).
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charter in favor of pre-charter government. The unanswered ques-
tion whether charter abolition, a local organic act, is a matter a
municipality is authorized by law to control by legislative action
is troublesome, but one is likely to look sympathetically upon the
result achieved.
The constitutional classification of municipalities by popula-
tion into cities (5,000 or more) and villages (less than 5,000) is
definitive and exclusive. The General Assembly may not effect
further classification for any purpose.38 This perpetuates a pattern
established by the municipal code adopted in 1902. The code makes
provision for incorporation of villages, but takes no cognizance of
the exceptional case of a community of 5,000 or over.3
Under Section 7 of Article XVIII "Any municipality may frame
and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject
to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all
powers of local self-government." Since Section 3 is considered
self-executing it has been declared that ". . . a municipality in
adopting a charter as authorized by Section 7 is merely exercising
a permissive authority of local self-government conferred upon all
municipalities by section 3 . . ."38 It is clear that a home rule
charter cannot enlarge municipal powers. So far as substantive
powers are concerned its function is primarily, if not exclusively,
distributive. Whether such powers can actually be limited or cut
down by a home rule charter is an inquiry pursued elsewhere in
this issue of the Journal.3 9
"City of Mansfield v. Endly, 38 Ohio App. 528 (1931), aff'd 124 Ohio
St. 652 (1931); City of Elyria v. Vandemark, 100 Ohio St. 365, 126 N.E.
314 (1919).
"I OHIO GEN. CoDx §3516 et seq. Unincorporated communities with popu-
lation far in excess of 5,000 exist in the United States. Kannapolis, N.C.,
has 20,000 or more people.
I State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 580, 53 N.E. 2d 501,
504 (1944). If this were strictly true would not Section 7 be superfluous?
'Comment, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 121 (1948).
Some home rule charters purport expressly to render the general laws
of the state, present and future, governing municipal corporations, appli-
cable to the charter cities concerned insofar as there is no conflict. Is the
effect to leave a given municipality with less power than is granted by
Section 3, Article XVIII, if the statutes so incorporated by reference grant
less authority than does Section 3? The Court of Appeals for Lawrence
County assumed in the opinion in a recent case, as yet unreported, that
home rule powers might be constricted in this way, although it was con-
cerned merely with the manner of exercise of a municipal power. Hugger
v. City of Ironton (decided Aug. 17, 1947); appeal dismissed for want of a
debatable constitutional question, 148 Ohio St. 670 (1948). The court's
answer to the point that a municipality could not cut down a direct con-
stitutional grant was that such power as was denied or taken away could
as readily be restored by charter amendment. Counsel wanted to be ad-
vised how there could be incorporation by reference of general laws on
[Vol. )
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It seems safe to say here that the main function of charter-
making in Ohio is the fashioning of governmental organization.
There is wide freedom of choice in erecting the executive, adminis-
trative and legislative framework. It is elementary that separation
of powers does not apply to municipal government. It is doubtful
even that the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power
would apply, since Section 7 is unqualified in this respect. When it
comes to the court structure, however, we find that home rule
power is practically nil.
Courts
Section 1 of Article IV, Constitution of Ohio, reads, "The judicial
power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals,
courts of common pleas, courts of probate, and such other courts
inferior to the courts of appeals as may from time to time be estab-
lished by law."
In State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiler,40 the court held
that the attempt of the city of Gallipolis to create a municipal
court by its charter was beyond the power of the municipality. The
city argued that its action was within the scope of Section 3, Article
XVIII, granting to municipalities authority to exercise all powers
of local self-government, but the court replied that "A power so
extraordinary and vital should not rest upon any lass foundation
than express grant or clear and necessary implication and we find
neither in the Constitution .... Section 1, Article IV, is a special
provision of the Constitution that has to do with the creation of
courts, and as such supersedes the general power of local self-
government, as granted in Section 3, Article XVIII."41 The phrase
in Section 1, Article IV, "as may from time to time be established
by law" was interpreted to mean law passed by the general as-
sembly of the state. Thus, in the matter of the creation of courts
we would seem to be in an area of exclusive state jurisdiction. The
common legislative practice is to create particular municipal courts
for the large cities by special acts. The uniformity requirement of
Section 26 of Article II is not considered applicable.4 2 With respect
matters of local self-government since, under the exclusive jurisdiction
theory, there could be no valid laws of that sort to be incorporated in a
charter. The court did not discuss the point-. It is not clear, in any event,
how future statutes could be incorporated presently by reference. Would
that not involve an ineffective attempt at abdication of municipal power?
Section 232 of the charter of the City of Columbus obviates the problem
of charter amendment suggested here by incorporating only such general
laws. as were not in conflict with the charter or with ordinances or reso-
lutions thereafter adopted.
112 Ohio St. 468, 147 N.E. 647 (1925).
Id. 'at 473, 474, 147 N.E. at 649.
OnRo Gnx. CoDE §1558-1 et seq. Apparently the uniformity objection
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to the judicial establishment we are, thus, no further away from
the evils of special legislation affecting municipal government than
we were a century ago.
Four years after the Hutsinpiller decision the case of State
ex rel. Ramey v. Davis4S presented a question as to maintenance of
a municipal court, which had been created by special act of the
, general assembly.44 The statute required the council of the city of
Toledo to "provide suitable accommodations for the municipal
court and its officers, including a private room for each judge and
sufficient jury room," to "provide for the use of the court complete
sets of the reports of the Supreme and inferior courts of the state
and such other books as the judges of the municipal court may from
time to time deem necessary," and "to provide for each court room
the latest edition of the General Code of Ohio, and necessary sup-
plies, including telephones, stationery, furniture, books, typewrit-
ers, heat, light and janitor service." The city councilmen refused
to comply and the incumbent judges of the newly-created court
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county commissioners
to provide a place for housing the court. The theWy was that the
court being a state court, and the county an agency of the state,
the county, not the self-governing municipality, was the proper
governmental unit to carry out the state's mandate. The writ was
denied. The court reasoned that "Power to create a court carries
with it the power to define its jurisdiction and to provide for its
maintenance."
A unanimous court, speaking through Judge Robinson, de-
clared, "By the adoption of Section 3 of Article XVIII the state did
not cede the territory of the municipalities to other sovereigns, but
only surrendered to the inhabitants of such territory the sovereign
right to locally govern themselves, and as to all sovereign powers
not thus surrendered, the sovereignty of the state over such terri-
tory remained supreme .... ,,15 Under our system of government
sovereignty rests in the people, and when the people speak through
the Constitution they are organizing the state for political purposes.
The constitution does not surrender but devolves or delegates
powers.46 It is believed that Judge Johnson was nearer the mark,
when in writing the opinion of the court in the case of Fitzgerald
was not even raised in the leading case of State ex rel. Fox v. Yeatman, 89
Ohio St. 44, 105 N.E. 74 (1913).
1119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929).
OHio GEN. CODE §1579-276 et seq.
,State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 599, 165 N.E. 298,
300 (1929).
-See Onio CONST. Art. I, §20 "... all powers not herein delegated
remain with the people." It is elementary American constitutional theory
that state legislatures have plenary power except as limited. The quoted
clause is interesting in that connection.
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v. Cleveland,4 7 he declared: "There has been a new distribution of
governmental power. The distribution has been made by the
people."
This, however, does not impeach the decision in the Rahey
case. The fact that the people have given municipalities powers of
local self-government does not mean that they cannot be employed
by the state, as before, in matters within state jurisdiction.
Police and Fire Departments
These departments, by force of a series of Supreme Court de-
cisions, occupy a unique position in the governmental structure of
municipalities. Under the decisions of the Court in Cincinnati v.
Gamble,48 State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill,49 State ex rel. O'Driscoll v.
Cull,50 and State ex rel. Strain v. Houston," it has become estab-
lished law that both police and fire protection are matters of state-
wide concern "and under the control of state sovereignty.5 , 2 Thus,
we again encounter an area of state supremacy.
In the Gamble case, which involved the legality of a city re-
tirement system set up by Cincinnati for its policemen and firemen
in lieu of that contemplated by statute, the court invoked the
familiar conception that a municipality operates in a dual capacity
-for itself in the conduct of its own particular business, and as
an agent of the state, in local administration of state affairs. Said
Judge Williams for the Court, "As to one function, a city or village
exercises the powers of local self-government within imposed limi-
tations, and, as to the other, acts as. an arm or agency of the sover-
eign state. '53 Fire and police protection being matters of state-wide
concern, the municipalities act in relation thereto as arms of the
state, and the state being the principal may in the exercise of its
sovereignty impose duties and responsibilities upon them as its
agencies.
Judge Williams took it as previously settled in Ohio that police
protection was an object of state concern. He relied upon a passage
in the opinion in a tort case which declared that a municipality
engaged in police protection is performing a governmental function
with respect to which it enjoys the sovereign immunity of the
state.5 4 The case actually arose out of street repair operations. So
"88 Ohio St. 338, 360, 103 N.E. 512, 518 (1913).
"138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E. 2d 226 (1941).
"142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E. 2d 501 (1944).
138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E. 2d 49 (1941).
"138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E. 2d 219 (1941).
1 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E. 2d 226 (1941), para-
graph 4 of syllabus.
Id. at 227, 34 N.E. 2d at 230.
"City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 284, 156 N.E. 210, 211
(1927).
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far, moreover, as the specious "governmental versus proprietary"
I test, employed in tort actions against municipalities, is concerned,
a particular activity might well be labeled governmental even
though the function was local. Certainly that was true of the street
repair work involved in the very case cited. More to the point, but
not mentioned, was the following paragraph in a per curiam opin-
ion in a 1923 case:
"The matter of the appointment of police officers is purely a
matter of local self-government, and while the mayor of a city may
be called to account for the conduct of such officers, of which he has
knowledge, he may not be removed from office by reason of the
past history or general character of such appointees."55
It was apparently the assumption of the majority in the Gamble
case that all aspects of police protection as administered by a mu-
nicipality are state business. The opinion came close to saying that
state jurisdiction is exclusive. There was no suggestion that there
might be local autonomy in organization, personnel and adminis-
tration subject only to state requirements and standards as to
character and extent of service and quality of performance. The
point was made that if a police department is a "purely" municipal
matter it could be abolished and the state would be unable to pre-
vent it. But could there not be a middle ground? Granted that
police protection is not purely municipal, it can with as much
force be urged that the function is not purely a state concern.
Under a home rule set-up is it not reasonable to make the distinc-
tion suggested above?
If, of course, we are talking about an area of state power quite
outside the reach of Article XVIII, it is idle to dwell upon the mean-
ing of "local police, sanitary and other similar regulations." It is
fairly clear that Judge Williams would not have accorded them a
breadth of meaning which would embrace organizational and ad-
ministrative provisions as well as local regulation of the conduct
of the citizenry, or which would be as wide as the police power.
He spoke to the point three years later in a concurring opinion in
the Sherrill case. There he said that the intent was to use the term
"regulations" in the sense of "municipal legislative acts which make
an act an offense and prescribe a penalty" and thus to preserve
the pre-home rule status of state and municipal jurisdictions as to
misdemeanors.56
In a cryptic dissenting opinion in the Gamble case Judge
Turner put the subject of police retirement funds in the local self-
government province, "At least until such time as the state, by
I State ex rel. Vogt v. Donahey, 108 Ohio St. 440, 445, 140 N.E. 609,
611 (1923).
1 See State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 141 Ohio St. 574, 587, 53 N.E.
2d 501, 507, 508 (1944).
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general laws, shall take over the police and fire departments of the
state (municipalities?), the employees of such departments are mu-
nicipal employees, and their employment, discharge, organization,
pay, pension, etc., remain matters of local self-government. 57 He
did not elaborate. His theory appears to be that the state could
take over police protection entirely but that so long as munici-
palities are left with responsibility in the field they can have the
final say as to organization, personnel and administration.
The Cull and Gamble cases were both decided May 7, 1941, and
the Houston case later that year. In the Cull case a Cleveland
civil service requirement that an applicant for the position of
patrolman have a high school education fell before a statutory
prohibition on "educational requirements as a condition of taking
a civil service examination." The Houston case involved a success-
ful attack upon Cincinnati's departure from a statute so regulating
the hours of labor of firemen as to increase their time off and the
payroll burden of the city without providing additional revenue to
meet the expense. Judge Hart spoke for the majority in both cases.
While he, too, placed both fire and police protection in the state-
concern category, he also stressed conflict with general laws. This
leaves us in some confusion. The state-concern idea is the basis
for a complete theory in itself. It opens an area of state jurisdic-
tion beyond the reach of Section 3 of Article XVIII. Even if we
attempt to apply the second clause of Section 3, it seems not a little
strained to put civil service requirements or provision for a platoon
system for firemen in the "local police, sanitary and other similar
regulations" category.
It must be rather ironical to Ohio devotees of home rule that in.
at least two states, where there is no provision for constitutional
home rule, legislation designed to control municipal discretion as
to such matters as the pay of policemen and the work program of
firemen has been knocked out with no better juristic weapon than
the discredited notion that there is an inherent right to local self-
government. 8
The most recent decision involving police departments was the
Sherrill case. A Cincinnati patrolman was charged with certain
violations of police department rules and ordered to appear before
the city manager, who intended to hear and determine the charges
by virtue of a grant of authority in the city charter to "appoint,
"See Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 232, 34 N.E. 2d 266, 232
(1941).,
'City of Lexington ir. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S.W.' 477 (1902);
State of Montana ex reL. Kern v. Arnold, 100 Mont. 346, 49 P. 2d 97
(1935). It is-to he noted, ho-wever, that-the-majority-view-in_.the-home rule.
states accords with that o' OQhii.. See -Axberg-.y. City. of-.Lincoln, 141 Neb.
55, 2 N.W. 2d 613 (1942), and note 141 A.L.R. 903, 904 (1:942)- .:- o -
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and dismiss, suspend, and discipline all officers and employees
in the administrative service under his control." The defendant
sought a writ of prohibition to stop the city manager from hearing
the charges on the ground that under Section 4368, General Code,
the director of public safety "shall have all powers and duties con-
nected with and incident to the appointment, regulation and gov-
ernment of these departments (police and fire), except as otherwise
provided by law." By subsequent sections the director of public
safety is given power to hear and determine charges made against
policemen and firemen and to inflict such punishment as is justified
under the facts in each particular case.
The court, speaking through Judge Bell, held that the charter
was in conflict with the provisions of the General Code and yielded
thereto. The court reiterated that "matters pertaining to a police
department are of state-wide concern" and added that munici-
palities, charter or otherwise, are without authority to adopt regu-
lations in respect thereto which are in conflict with general law.
A very significant point was made that even though "the police
department of a city is a matter of state-wide concern (this) does
not prevent the city from adopting any regulation in reference
thereto so long as such regulation does not conflict with general
laws." Despite the talk of conflict with general laws this power
to act in an area of state concern does not appear to derive from
either grant of Section 3 of Article XVIII, since the court had
already laid it down that the first grant embraced only matters of a
purely local nature. Judge Bell does not fully explain it. Judge
Williams, the author of the majority opinion in the Gamble case,
undertook to do so in a concurring opinion. He wrote: "A consid-
eration of the above-quoted constitutional provisions (speaking of
Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII) naturally divides itself into three
heads: (1) local police, sanitary and other similar regulations; (2)
powers of local self-government where such regulations are not in-
volved; (3) the power or authority of the municipality to act in
matters of state-wide concern."5 9 As to the third, he declared that
when the state does not invade or pre-empt the field the munici-
pality, of necessity, may act voluntarily. But why "necessarily"?
The legislature is free, if it chooses, to devolve authority upon a
local arm, such as a municipality, in order to get state business
done.
Health Departments
It was long since decided that the legislature had authority to
create health districts throughout the state and to impose the' bur-
'See State ex tel. Arey v. Sherrill, '142 Ohio St., 574, 586, 53 N.E.
2d 501, 507 (1944).
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den of contributing tax funds thereto upon cities and villages.00
Said the court: "we think it clear that when the legislature in the
exercise of the general legislative power conferred by Section 1,
Article II, of the Constitution, has adopted general laws providing
sanitary and other similar regulations, such legislation is effective
throughout the state."'" There was no problem of "conflict" in this
case. The state was exercising positive control regardless of mu-
nicipal action.
City of Bucyrus v. State Department of Health62 involved re-
view of an order of the State Department of Health, issued to the
city of Bucyrus, to install works or means, satisfactory to the di-
rector of health, for collecting and disposing of the sewage of the
city in a manner calculated to correct and prevent the pollution
of the Sandusky River by such sewage.
The court, in affirming the order, pointed out that "The sur-
render of the sovereignty of the state to the municipalities by
[Article XVIII] was a partial surrender only, and, with reference
to sanitary regulations, was expressly limited to such sovereignty
as the state itself had not or thereafter has not exercised by the
enactment of general laws."63 Here again the situation was not
one of conflict of a local sanitary regulation with general law. The
legislature, through an administrative agency acting under general
law, was compelling a municipality to take affirmative steps to re-
move a health hazard. Legislative power does not appear to stop
short of this; the area is one of legislative supremacy and state
,action may be directed against local units of government as well
as individuals to achieve the purpose.
The Bucyrus case heralded the emergence of the state-wide
concern concept. "It is a matter of concern to the whole state
whether a municipality so dispose of its sewage as to breed disease
within the municipality."" The court did not, however, suggest
that health protection was within an area of power outside Section
3, Article XVIII. There is express authority under Section 3, Article
XVIII, to enact; local sanitary and other similar regulations not in
conflict with general laws. Regulation of collection and removal
of garbage, for example, plainly falls within the scope of the
granted power.6 5
'State ex tel. Village of Cuyahoga Heights v. Zangerle, 103 Ohio St.
566, 134 N.E. 686 (1921).
"Id. at 577, 134 N.E. at 690.
" 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); accord, State ex rel. Neal v.
Williams, 120 Ohio St. 432, 166 N.E. 377 (1929).
'City of Bucyrus v. State Department of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426,
427, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
=Id. at 428, 166 N.E. .at 371.
"State ex rel. Moock v. Cincinnati, 120 Ohio'St. 500, 166 N.E. 583
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The latest chapter in the history of "municipal" health depart-
ments in the state was written in State ex rel. Mowrer v. Under-
wood,"" a case involving the selection of candidates for various
positions in the department of public health of the city of Akron.
The city charter provided for the creation and appointment of a
health commission and a director of public health. The charter
also contained civil service provisions for employees of the health
department. A taxpayer sought mandamus upon behalf of the city
to compel the city personnel director and civil service commission
to comply with the civil service sections of the charter by preparing
an eligibility list of employees and to comply with the civil service
sections of the charter and to compel the city director for public
health and the health commission to make appointments from lists
so prepared to fill vacancies in the public health department.
Section 1261-16, General Code, reads in part: "For the purposes
oaf local health administration the state shall be divided into health
districts. Each city shall constitute a health district and for the
purposes of this act shall be known as and hereinafter referred to
as a city health district." Section 4404, General Code, provides
that "The Council of each city constituting a city health district,
shall establish a ,board of health. . . ." In dividing the state into
health districts, the General Assembly, in the same act, repealed the
then existing statutes which authorized municipalities to establish
and appoint boards of health within their local governments. This
measure, known as the Griswold Act, struck from the Hughes Act,
the basic health district measure, the provisions which placed the
employees of health districts under civil service.
The court held that the statute withdrew previously granted
powers of local health administration from the municipalities, cre-
ated in each city a health district which was a separate political
subdivision of the state, independent of the city with which it was
coterminous, and delegated to it the health powers withdrawn from
the municipality. This was squared with home rule on the theory
that Article XVIII did not surrender the sovereign power of the
state to protect the public health. Health protection was, in short,
a matter of state-wide concern. Finally, it was stated that in strik-
ing out the civil service provisions of the Hughes Act the legis-
lature thereby clearly manifested an intent that employees of the
health district were to be exempt from civil service requirements,
and, therefore, the civil service requirements in the city charter
did not apply.
(1929); City of Canton v. Van Voorhis, 61 Ohio App. 419, 22 N.E. 2d
651 (1939).
137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E. 2d 773 (1940).
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There was a proviso in the statute purporting to preserve to a
municipality constituting a health district authority to provide by
charter for health administration "other than as in this section
provided." This was interpreted to permit charter provisions
supplementing the health district scheme but not an administrative
pattern "different from" it. The legislature, it was asserted, could
not possibly have used the expression "other than" in the latter
sense. It seems to the writers, however, that the very use of a
proviso, as well as the words "other than," is m6re in keeping with
the idea of a variation than of supplementation. The General As-
sembly, at its next session, confirmed this by so revising the section
as to call for the administrative set-up provided by the act unless
an administration of public health service "different from" that
provided in the act had been established and maintained under a
municipal charter prior to the effective date of the act8 7
To recur, however, to the home rule question in the case, one is
struck by the broad implications of the court's 'reasoning: The
statute was upheld as a withdrawal of health powers from munici-
palities. It so happens that the board of health of a city health
district is appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the council
and that the mayor serves as its president. This is not a matter
of legal necessity. Since the district is considered a state agency
it would appear that its organization might be entirely independent
of the city. Furthermore, municipal power to pass health regula-
tions might, for all that appears, be transferred in toto to this state
agency.
The logic of the fire, police and health cases is that the legis-
lature could provide by general law for separate and independent
ad hoc units of government, coterminous with municipalities, to
take over fire, police, and health functions as arms of the state and
to the exclusion of the municipalities. This is, indeed, a startling
result. In the realm of organization and administration it greatly
constricts the first grant of Section 8 of Article XVIII. With respect
to police and health regulations under the police power it means
that the General Assembly may take away what the- constitution
has given by the second grant of Section 3.
Conservancy Districts and Other Special Function or Ad Hoc Units
One of the leading cases under this heading is Miami County v.
Dayton, 8 which involved the validity of a state law creating con-
servancy districts for flood control purposes.89 The city of Dayton
protested the imposition of the three-tenths mill levy under the
statute on the ground that such an act was an invasion of the city's
, Omo GEN. CODE §4404, as amended by, 119 Ohio Laws 551, § 1 (1941).
92 Ohio St. 215, 110 N.E. 726 (1915).
"104 Ohio Laws 13 ef seq., Omo GENJ"CODE §6828-1 et seq.
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constitutional power granted by Section 3, Article XVIII. The court
held that creation of conservation districts was an exercise of the
state police power as granted to the legislature in Article II, Section
36, which reads in part: "Laws may also be passed ... to provide
for the conservation of the natural resources of the state, including
streams, lakes, submerged and swamp lands and the development
and regulation of water power and the formation of drainage and
conservation districts."
Speaking of the home rule provisions of the constitution, the
court said, "The doctrine in no wise applies to the creation of drain-
age or conservation districts, where the power to be exercised is
peculiarly a state power, the sovereign police power. It has always
been recognized as peculiarly the function of the states."' 0 Reliance
was placed also on the fact that a conservancy district might over-
lap a number of counties, townships and municipalities. The case
could easily have been decided on the basis of constitutional con-
struction alone, since both Article II, Section 36, and Article XVIII,
Section 3 were adopted on the same day. The former is a specific
grant of power to the legislature which would take precedence over
the general grant to municipalities made by the latter.
Where there is a specific constitutional grant of power to the
state to establish certain districts and provide legislation for the
regulation thereof, the problem is somewhat simplified. But where
the state establishes such a district without express constitutional
authority resort must be had to general principles. It is safe to
say that the legislature may provide for ad hoc units of government
to perform this or that function. The rub comes, however, when
the effect of the use of the device is to oust municipalities of their
powers of local self-government. On the other hand, where a gov-
ernmental problem is no respecter of corporate limits or for other
reasons cannot be met by the exertion of municipal powers it is not
evident that the legislature is powerless to create appropriate
ad hoc governmental units for the purpose and devolve upon them
the powers needed to do the job. Such would appear to be the
case with public housing authorities whose objects are slum clear-
ance and provision of housing for people of small income. 7
1
PERSoNNEL
It was early declared, in State ex rel. Frankenstein v. Hillen-
brand,2 that "whatever difficulty this court may have encountered
in accurately designating the subjects comprehended in 'local self-
"Miami County v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 236, 110 N.E. 726, 732 (1915).
"The Housing Authority Law deliberately provides for the establish-
ment of metropolitan housing authorities only in a portion of a county
comprising all or portions of two or more subdivisions. O~ro GEN. CODE
§1078-30.
" 100 Ohio St. 339, 343, 126 N.E. 309, 310 (1919).
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government,' as contra-distinguished from 'local police, sanitary
and other similar regulations,' it has had no difficulty in arriving at
the conclusion that the qualification, /duties and manner of selection
of officers, purely municipal, come within the purview of the pro-
vision granting a city 'local self-government.' " A significant prac-
tical aspect of this case was the holding that the first officers under
a new charter could be voted upon at the same election as the
charter itself.
Civil Service
r It will be remembered that Section 10 of Article XV of the
constitution requires the merit system in the state, county and city
civil service. This does not apply to villages.7 8 Soon after the Home
-Rule Amendment was adopted it was held that a home rule charter
provision for a civil service commission, which complied with -Sec-
tion 10 of Article XV, prevailed over the general statute on the
theory that regulation of city civil service was within the powers
of local self-government. 4 In 1928 'home rule power as to civil
service was sustained in a case involving a city civil service regula-
tion, inconsistent with statute, under which one was rendered
eligible for appointment as chief of police on the basis of faithful
service although he had not passed a civil service examination.7 5
In 1941 the Supreme Court reached a directly opposite result as to
police department personnel without mention of the 1928 case.70
]k city civil service commission requirement that applicants for
positions as patrolmen be high school graduates was found to be
in conflict with the general statute and the latter was given con-
trolling effect on the ground that police protection is a matter of
statewide concern. The court has decided, as we have seen, that
fire and health protection are -also state concerns and, thus, state
civil service provisions would govern in those areas. This state-
wide concern concept as applied to police, fire and health protec-
tion has already received extended comniant in the discussion of
governmental structure. It seems fairly evident that such a notion
had to be employed if the court was ,to get away, in these areas,
from its original broad position that regulation of the civil service
of a city is an exercise of a power of local self-government. While
the "state-concern" concept was not plainly isolated in the majority
opinion in the Cull case, but was tied to the "non-conflict" clause
of Section 3, Judge Turner made it clear enough, in a dissenting
"State ex rel.. Giovanello v. Village of Lowellville, 139 Ohio St. 219,
3.9 N.E. 2d 527 (1942). But Why could not a village provide for civil service
by home rule charter quite apart from Article XV, since, as we shall see,
regulation of city civil service isconsidered a home rule matter?
1. State ex rel. Lentz v. Edwards, 90 .Ohio St 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914).
Hile v. Cleveland, 118 Ohio St. 99, 160 N.E. 621 (1928).
" State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio"St. 516, 37 N.E. 2d 49 (1941).
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opinion, that civil service 'regulation did not fall under the second
grant of Section 3 of Article XVIII, since it was neither a police,
sanitary nor similar regulation.77
A special act of the legislature establishing a municipal court
in Akron made the tenure of the bailiffs, deputy bailiffs, deputy
clerks, cashiers, and stenographers of the court subject to the
pleasure of the appointing power. The Akron charter placed all
these positions in the classified service. The Court of Appeals, in
Underwood v. Isham, 7 decided that the statute governed. The re-
sult is in keeping with the principle of the Hutsinpiller case79 but
the opinion expresses misconceptions which leave it rather more
confusing than helpful. Thus, it was asserted that about the only
change made by the home rule amendment was to make the validity
of municipal action depend upon whether there was a statute pre-
empting the field to the exclusion of the municipality. This does
not consist with the Supreme Court's long-established interpreta-
tion that a municipality is supreme in the domain of local self-
government.
The mayor of a municipality is usually the chief law enforce-
ment officer. Thus, he is a key figure in police protection. All would
agree that his office is largely, if not fully, within the domain of
local self-government. Yet, wherein is his function as chief con-
servator of the peace any the less a subject of state concern than
the position of chief of police? Since his functions are not purely
municipal why do not the fire and police protection cases logically
sweep his office into the ample domain of state-wide concerns?
In State ex rel. Daly v. Toledo,8" an ordinance of the city of
Toledo provided for compulsory retirement of members of the
police and fire divisions at the age of 65 years. Section 486-17a,
General Code, contained a provision making tenure of officers
-under the act dependent upon "good behavior and efficient service,"
and providing that removal should be only for inefficiency, neglect
of duty and similar reasons. The court found that there was a
conflict between the ordinance and statute and held that the latter
prevailed. The court failed to identify the grant of power in Sec-
tion 3, Article XVIII, to which they were referring, but the lan-
guage used is appropriate to the second grant of power. Perhaps
"conflict" was not being used in the Section 3 sense; under the
court's view, that fire protection is a state concern, the statute
would govern independently of Section 3 of Article XVIII.
" Id. at 521, 523, 37 N.E. 2d at 52, 53. It has to do with public organi-
zation and administration and does not control private conduct.
" 61 Ohio App. 129, 22 N.E. 2d 468 (1939).
'State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468, 147 N.E.
647 (1925).
'142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E. 2d 338 (1943).
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Contemporary problems of :labor relations have cropped up in
'municipal employment. Hagerman v. Dayton8 was a declaratory
judgment proceeding instituted by the Director of Finance of
Dayton to determine the validity of an ordinance providing for a
check-off on the wages or salary of certain civil service employees
of the city, who belonged to a union and who had assented to the
arrangement. Section 6346-13, General Code, provides that an
assignment of wages or salary is invalid, unless there is a contract
"between the employers and their employes, or as between em-
ployers, employes, and any labor union as to any check-olf on the
wages of such employes as may be agreed upon."
The court held that municipal corporations were not "employ-
ers" within the meaning of 6346-13 and that civil service appointees
are not "employes" under that section. The ordinance was classed
as a police regulation and thus was overridden by Section 6346-13.
Thus, the prohibition of that Section was applied to municipal em-
ployees while the exception was not. It was concluded, moreover,
that the ordinance was in conflict with "the spirit and purpose of
the civil service laws of the state." The opinion went further; it
declared broadly that in view of the, provisions of the constitution
and statutes on civil service, unions have "no function which they
may discharge in connection with civil service appointees." It is
not at all clear that the civil service laws cover the whole ground.
82
Might not such matters as pleasant, working conditions be put for-
ward by union action, be it only by a petition and not on the basis
of an asserted right to collective bargaining?
If the check-off ordinance was a local police regulation, any
municipal measure concerning the terms or conditions of employ-
ment of municipal personnel might as readily be put in the same
category. All affect human welfare. -Municipal provision for a
cost-of-living salary bonus would be a local police regulation. So
would an ordinance creating an employees' welfare fund to be fed
by salary deductions or otherwise.
Judge Zimmerman, in a concurring opinion, preferred to rest
on the theory that the ordinance 'under consideration did not ac-
complish a governmental, public or municipal purpose, but was an
ultra vires attempt to promote the private interests of a nonpublic
organization. 3 On this basis deductions under a private hospitali-
147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E. 2d 246 (1947).
It is worthy of note that the Dayton Charter, Section 93 et seq., regu-
lates civil service. It would seem that a discussion of the scope of civil
service regulations applicable to Dayton should direct attention to the
governing charter provisions.
8'In Maryland the legality of a municipal check-off at the instance of
individual employees has been sustained. Mugford v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A. 2d 745 (1946). (Baltimore is a
home-rule city.)
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zation plan might be in jeopardy. In either case, the members sup-
port a group arrangement they consider beneficial to them as indi-
viduals. This rationalization does, however, avoid some of the de-
batable points presented in the principal opinion.
The Attorney General has expressed the opinion that the appli-
cable state civil service laws apply until a municipality has made
provisions in its charter to implement Section 10 of Article XV.8 4
It is true that the Lentz case,85 in which it was first held that local
civil service matters were under powers of local self-government,
involved a situation in which the city had adopted a charter. How-
ever, the statements in that case were also broad enough to include
non-charter municipalities. Furthermore, the Lentz case was de-
cided before the court definitely decided that Section 3, Article
XVIII, is self-executing. The. crux of the matter is the relation of
civil service to governmental organization. Does Section 7 relate
merely to the "bare bones" of governmental structure or does
charter-making embrace the fashioning of governmental organiza-
tion in a full-blown sense? The former interpretation is not com-
pelled by the use of the word "government" in Section 7 and it is
open to the objection that it would both materially narrow popular
participation in home rule by placing wide authority over organiza-
tion primarily in local legislative hands and would render charter-
making all the more formalistic.
Since, as we have seen, municipalities have no power to create
courts or regulate the administration of justice, state law is supreme
as to judicial review of administrative action in civil service mat-
ters.
Qualifications of Electors
In 1917 the case of State ex rel. Taylor v. French87 reached the
Supreme Court of Ohio. The charter of East Cleveland provided
that women should have the right to vote for all municipal elective
officers and to hold any municipal office. At that time the Ohio
Constitution, Section 1, Article V, contained the provision that
"every white male citizen... of the age of twenty-one years...
shall be entitled to vote at all elections." The court upheld the
charter provision as a valid exercise of a power of local self-
government. The court was careful to point out, however, that a
municipality could not "confer upon women the right to vote for,
or exercise any of the functions of, an officer created by the Con-
stitution or by the General Assembly." Section 1 of Article V con-
" 1941 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 3846, citing State ex tel. Jackson
v. Dayton City Commission, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 378 (Ohio App. 1939).
" 90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914).
"In re Fortune, 138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E. 2d 442 (1941).
8 96 Ohio St. 172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917).
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trolled in all elections held to fill offices which the constitution
itself provided for, but not those to fill offices created by a city
charter.
The court mentioned the fact that counsel for the defendants
conceded that "it may well be that the power to prescribe the
qualifications of electors for the purpose of all local elections is
accurately classified as one of the powers of local self-government,"
but did not expressly approve or disapprove of this thought. In'
view of the holding in the Frankenstein case,"" it seems reasonable
to say that the power to prescribe qualifications of electors for the
purpose of all municipal elections is a power of local self-govern-
ment.
Nominations, Appointments and Elections
Municipalities may not prescribe the manner or method of
conducting elections for county and state officers.8 9 The mere fact
that as a matter of convenience these elections are at times con-
ducted concurrently with municipal elections does not enlarge the
jurisdiction of the municipality nor extend its power beyond its
own territorial limits. It is plain enough from the cases, however,
that municipalities are authorized under Section 3 of Article XVIII
to determine the selection of municipal officers, which shall be ap-
pointed and which elected, the method of nomination and the
manner of conducting elections for municipal officers.
In the leading case of Fritzgeald v. Cleveland,90 the problem
arose as to the power of a municipality, by home rule charter, to
abolish nomination by direct primary, to provide for nomination
by petition and to abolish the party mark or emblem on the
ballot. Section 7 of Article V of the constitution provides, in part,-1
that "All nominations for elective state, district, county and munici-
pal offices shall be made at direct primary elections or by petition
as provided by law. .. ." The majority, in upholding the charter
provision, harmorzed the pertinent provisions of Articles V and
XVIII by treating the subject as within the sweep of powers of
local self-government and interpreting "law," as used in Section
7 of Article V, broadly to include a home rule charter as well as
a statute. The three dissenting judges, speaking through Judge
Donahue, insisted that "law" referred unambiguously and simply__
to statute law.91
"State ex rel. Frankenstein v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St. 339, 126 N.E.
309 (1919).
"State ex rel. Automatic Registering Machine Co. v. Green, 121 Ohio
St. 301, 168 N.E. 131 (1929).
"88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
"As Judge Jones later pointed out in Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128
Ohio St. 354, 191 N.E. 366 (1934), the word "law" or "laws" was employed
repeatedly in the 1912 amendments and this, he thought, disclosed, on the
19481
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A municipality may make provision in its charter for propor-
tional representation. Whether to employ that system of voting is
a choice within the domain of local self-government. 2 Section I
of Article V of the constitution gives one with the qualifications
of an elector the right "to vote at all elections" but that is not
interpreted to mean that he is entitled to vote separately and speci-
fically for a nominee for each office.
9 3
While it is beyond the power of a municipality to create a
court in Ohio, a home rule charter may provide that the president
of the council may exercise the judicial powers of a mayor con-
ferred by general law.9 4 Except for interim appointments all
judgeships in Ohio are made strictly elective by Article IV. Thus,
a home rule charter could not validly provide for the selection of
an officer, such as a mayor or council president, who would exercise
judicial powers conferred by statute, except by election.
A home rule charter provided that candidates for an elective
office should be nominated only by petition, which was not to be
signed by any elector more than 60 days prior to the day of the
election and which was to be filed with the election officials not
less than 40 days previous to the day of the election. Section 4785-92,
General Code, required that "Nominating petitions of candidates
shall be filed with the same election authority as is provided for
the filing of declaration of candidacy not later than 6:30 p.m. on
the sixtieth day prior to the date of election." Five candidates for
judge of the police court filed under the charter. Prohibition was
sought to prevent the board of elections from placing their names
on the ballot.9 5
The court held that the judge of a municipal police court is a
municipal officer even though the court itself was created by state
statute and that, under the grant of all powers of local self-gov-
ernment, a municipality has power to determine the manner of
selection of municipal officers (which in the case of judges means
whole, a pretty clear intention to refer to legislative enactments only.
The Brewster case involved an ordinance but a charter would not appear
to be on any different footing for present purposes. The Brewster case
was, in a sense, a blow to home rule, because the court there decided that
Section 2, Article IV, of the constitution, which requires the concurrence
of at least all but one of the judges of the Supreme Court to declare a law
unconstitutional, did not apply to municipal ordinances.
'Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N.E. 27 (1923).
'In State ex rel. v. Constantine, 42 Ohio St. 437 (1884), the court
laid it down that each elector is entitled to vote for a candidate for each
office to be filled. The majority in the Reutener case thought this an un-
warranted extension of the plain language of Section 1, Article V, but
thought that the Home Rule Amendment governed in any event. Thus, the
Constantine case was not overruled. Judge Robinson dissented.
' Ide v. State, 95 Ohio St. 224, 116 N.E. 450 (1917).
"State ex rel. Stanley v. Bernon, 127 Ohio St. 204, 187 N.E. 733 (1933).
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election and no other methori of selection). Therefore, the city or-
dinance controlled the nomination of the candidates and the peti-
tions were valid. This decision provides quite a contrast with the
police, fire and health administration cases.
Salaries and Other Incidents of Office or Employment
With the possible exception of policemen, firemen and other
municipal officers and employees engaged in functions of "state-
wide concern," it may safely be laid down that the salaries of
municipal officers and employees are a matter of local self-govern-
ment.
Section 4209, General Code, provided that councilmen of cities
of 25,000 or less should not receive salaries in excess of $150 per
year, with a rising salary scale for each additional 30,000 inhabi-
tants. The city of Mansfield had paid salaries to its councilmen in
accordance with the scale set forth in a city ordinance, but which
was higher than the scale provided in Section 4209. The city brought
action to recover the amount of the alleged overpayments.9
The court determined that Section 4209 was in conflict with
Section 1 of Article XVIII of the constitution since it attempted a
classification of cities and villages different from that made by the
constitution. While this disposed of the case the court proceeded to
say, obiter, the amount of money a city pays to its councilmen is
purely a municipal matter and within "powers of local self-gov-
ernment." The ordinance prevailed and the salary payments were
sustained.
Matters pertaining to the employment of secretarial assistance,
apart from civil service factors in villages and non-charter cities,
provision for offices, purchases of supplies, hiring of consultants,
and the like, would seem to fall under the heading of powers of
local self-government. They involve a minimum of state interest.
Removal of Municipal Officers
In a concurring opinion Judge Wanamaker was emboldened
to list certain matters which he thought resided, without question,
in the domain of "all powers of local self-government."o) One of
these was the recall of municipal officers. Many home rule charters
doubtless have recall provisions. Considered alone, Article XVIII
would easily sustain Judge Wanamaker's conclusion. It should be
considered, however, with Section 38 of Article II, which reads:
"Laws shall be passed providing for the prompt removal from of-
fice, upon complaint and hearing, of all officers, including state of-
ficers, judges and members of the general assembly, for any mis-
"City of Mansfield v. Endly, 38 Ohio App. 528, 176 N.E. 462 (1931),
aff'd., 124 Ohio St. 652, 181 N.E. 886 (1931).
"See Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 362, 366, 103 N.E. 512,
518, 519 (1913).
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conduct involving moral turpitude or for other cause provided by
law; and this method of removal shall be in addition to impeach-
ment or other method of removal authorized by the constitution."
In a recent Court of Appeals case the municipal code provision for
recall was declared unconstitutional on the theory that the quoted
section applies to municipal officers and exacts the procedure of
complaint and hearing in all cases.98 If this is true of a statute gov-
erning a non-charter municipality why would it not also apply
to a recall provision of a home rule charter on the theory that Sec-
tion 38, Article II, would rule the general terms of Article XVIII?99
The soundness of the Court of Appeals' interpretation may, how-
ever, be questioned, as an original proposition. Section 38 of Article
II is addressed to removal for cause. The recall is a political process,
which may be employed without relation to grounds for removal
in any ordinary legal sense.
PROCEDURE
Is the adoption of rules of legislative and administrative pro-
cedure within the grant of all powers of local self-government?
If the primary power being exercised is itself within that grant,
one would suppose that the ancillary business of the manner of its
exercise would likewise be covered. Certainly, we entertain no
doubt that for most purposes the organization and procedure of a
municipal legislative body may be determined by home rule char-
ter or by the body itself under charter authority. °10 It seems to
have been assumed in the past that the general statutes would
govern non-charter municipalities in these matters. It is not evi-
dent why this must be so as to either legislative or administrative
procedure. In a recent Court of Appeals case, the issue was squarely
met and determined in favor of municipal autonomy. 0' The City of
Ironton sold unused land to the Federal Government for a nominal
price without complying with Section 3699, General Code, which
requires public sale on competitive bidding. It was held that both
the power and procedure of sale were matters within the grant of
all powers of local self-government.
State ex rel. Burnett v. Ducy, 44 N.E. 2d 803 (Ohio App. 1942).
It may be seriously doubted that home rule charters would be deemed
"laws" within the meaning of Section 38, Article II. There is a dictum in
Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 354, 357, 191 N.E. 366, 367 (1934),
to the effect that "laws" refers to legislative enactments only.
' State ex rel. Bateman v. Zachritz, 135 Ohio St. 580, 22 N.E. 2d 84
(1939). (Charter prescribed two-thirds vote to override planning com-
mission.); State ex rel. Hile v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 265, 160 N.E. 241
(1927). (Charter provision as to publication of ordinances prevailed over
OHio GEN. CoDE §4228).
" Hugger v. City of Ironton (Court of Apps. of Lawrence County, de-
cided Aug. 17, 1947, and not yet reported); appeal dismissed for want of a
debatable constitutional question, 148 Ohio St. 670 (1947).
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SuBSTANTI Hom RULE PowERs
Thus far we have been concerned largely with structure and
personnel. It is time to give attention to substantive home rule
powers. Perhaps the best approach in that area is to focus upon
particular governmental functions. In that way one should be able
to get a rather realistic view of home rule in action. It would be
rather artificial and quite repetitious to deal first with the grant
of all powers of local self-government in Section 3 and then treat
of the power to adopt police, -and the like, regulations.
Protection of Public Morals
We may as well begin with liquor and beer regulations. It is
in that area that the leading case in Ohio defining "conflict" with
general laws, Village of Struthers v. Soklol,102 arose. In that case
certain city ordinances, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquor as a beverage, made some acts crimes that were
not so by statute and also in at least one instance the penalty hin-
posed by ordinance was greater than that imposed by statute
covering the same offense. It was determined that the municipali-
ties concerned had authority under the second grant of Section 3
to legislate on the subject despite the existence of the prohibition
clause of Section 9 of Article XV (since repealed). That left the
question of conflict with general laws. The court declared that "no
real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declare something to
be right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa.
There can be no conflict unless one authority grants a permit or
license to do an act which is forbidden or prohibited by the
other.'1 0 3 It is not enough that the ordinance is more stringent
than the statute. Under this definition, the court found that there
was no technical "conflict" between the ordinances, which definitely
fell into the category of local police regulations, and the state
statutes. The ordinances and statutes merely differed in certain
respects, but the statutes did not prohibit something which the
ordinances allowed, or the converse. Nor was the double jeopardy
objection deemed valid. The same act may, at once, be a mis-
demeanor under both a statute and an ordinance.
The argument that the legislature, in controlling certain phases
of the liquor problem, intended by implication that all other acts
connected therewith should not be controlled, was rejected by the
court. Thus, conflict by negative implication was not allowed to
arise. As long as the statute said nothing, it meant nothing.
Closing hours for liquor and beer dispensing establishments
have given rise to several interesting decisions. In City of Coshocton
' 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
'Id. at 268, 140 N.E. at 521.
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v. Saba'04 there was an asserted clash between a regulation of the
State Liquor Board providing that "No intoxicating liquor may be
sold or permitted to be consumed on week days on the premises
of D-3 permit holders between the hours of 12:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m."
and a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of such beverages be-
tween the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. and all day on Sunday.
It was held that, even though it be conceded that the regulation of
the Liquor Board was a general law, still there was no "conflict"
between the ordinance and the regulation. The now familiar argu-
ment that the ordinance prohibited something, which, by implica-
tion, was allowed by the "general law," viz., the sale and consump-
tion of intoxicating liquor on week days from 10:00 p.m. to 12:00
a.m., was rejected. A like fate was met by the contention that since
the legislature expressly permitted municipal prohibition of all
sales of "intoxicating liquor" on Sundays regardless of the regu-
lations of the Board0 5 the ikule, expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius, should be invoked to establish that no other departure from
the state scheme was in order. The court simply held that if the
statute or regulations said nothing, it meant nothing.
Akron v. Scalera 1 presented an almost identical problem as
that in the Saba case with like results. A city ordinance prohibited
the sale of beer on Sunday. Section 6064-22, General Code, pro-
hibited the sale of beer to persons under 18 years of age, but said
nothing else concerning the regulation thereof. The court held that
the ordinance was a local police regulation and that no conflict was
present "merely because certain specific acts made unlawful by
ordinance are not referred to in any general law." The argument
that the state intended to take over the whole field by setting up
some regulations as to beer was again rejected.
Section 6064-17, General Code, provided that "not more than
one Class D-3, Class D-4, Class D-5 permit shall be issued for each
two thousand population, or part thereof, in any county, city or
village." A city ordinance provided that such permits "within the
corporate limits of the city of East Cleveland, shall be limited to
one for every thirty-five hundred (3500) of the population of the
city of East Cleveland, as shown by the latest federal census."
In a proceeding by a D-3 permit holder to compel the city manager
to issue him a license it was decided that the local police regula-
tion was in conflict with a general law and, therefore, invalid.
The case looks a great deal like an instance of conflict based on
implication. Both measures were couched in negative language;
the ordinance was the more stringent. Only by interpreting the
Th55 Ohio App. 40, 8 N.E. 2d 572 (1936).
OrIo Gz.. CODE §6064-22.
10135 Ohio St. 65, N.E. 2d 279 (1939).
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statute as permissive can the test of conflict in the Sokol case 07
be met.
Another closing hours case which reached the supreme court
was Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus.108 An ordinance of
the city of Columbus made it an offense to sell or serve beer and
intoxicating liquors on the premises of a permit holder after mid-
night of any day. General Code Section 6064-22, provided that "No
sale of intoxicating liquor shall be made after 2:30 a.m. on Sunday,"
and that "Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipal corpora-
tion or village from adopting an earlier closing hour for the sale
of intoxicating liquor on Sunday or to provide that no intoxicat-
ing liquor may be sold on Sunday."
Section 6064-15, General Code, provides that the holder of a
D-3a permit who also holds D-1 and D-2 permits may sell beer and
intoxicating liquor after the hour of 1:00 a.m. and during the same
hours as the holder of a D-5 permit. The statute is silent as to the
hours under a D-5 permit. It remained for administrative action to
fill the gap. The Board of Liquor Control was authorized by Sec-
tion 6064-3(i), General Code to regulate the hours during which
intoxicating liquor might be sold. The Board adopted Regulation
No. 30, which prohibited the sale and consumption of beer and
intoxicating liquors on the premises of a D-3a or D-5 permit holder
between the hours of 2:30 a.m. and 5:30'a.m. The Neil House held
D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-3a permits. It prayed a declaratory judgment in-
validating the ordinance insofar as it proscribed sales after mid-
night on its premises as a permit holder and sought an injunction
against enforcement of the ordinance in this respect. Plaintiff won
both in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court.
The majority concluded that there was conflict with a general
law. In adopting Regulation No. 30, the Board was acting as an
administrative agency of the legislature and it was "in effect, the
voice of the General Assembly heard through an agency of its
creation." Thus, the regulation was treated as a "general law"
within the meaning of Section 3, Article XVIII.
The rationalization of "conflict" is the significant feature of the
case. "When the statutes and a valid regulation of the Board of
Liquor Control say that the sale of intoxicants may not be made
after a designated hour, it is equivalent to saying that sales up to
that time are lawful, and an ordinance which attempts to restrict
sales beyond an earlier hour is in conflict therewith -and must
yield." 0 9 This is a clear example of conflict by implication, which
'Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
' 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E. 2d 665 (1944); discussed in 14 U. oF Cmi. L.
REV. 297 (1947). Chief Justice Weygandt and Judges Hart and Williams
dissented.
IC' 144 Ohio St. 248, 253, 58 N.E. 2d 665, 668 (1944).
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was rejected in the Saba case. 10 This case was certified to the
Supreme Court because the Court of Appeals found the judgment
rendered to be in conflict with thaf of a sister court in the Saba
case. The authority of the latter has, it appears, been pretty well
dissipated.
An attempt was made to distinguish Akron v. Scalera,1" by
simply stating that "the implications" of the Scalera case "are that
if a municipal ordinance of the type here involved is in collision
with a general law upon the same subject, the ordinance is in-
effective." It is true that the Scalera case contains some statements
that might give strength to the court's contention. For example,
"Our attention is not directed to any rule or regulation adopted
by the Board of Liquor Control with reference to the sale of beer
on Sunday." From this one might imply that had some regulation
been made on the subject, the court would have found a conflict
by implication.
Taken literally, Section 6064-15, General Code, authorized a
D-3a permit holder to do business until at least 1:00 a.m. The Board
regulation, however, did not, in terms, authorize anything. Thus,
while it can be urged with some force that the statute expressly
authorized sale during an hour covered by a municipal prohibition
there is also basis for the interpretation that affirmative authoriza-
tion was no more intended here than elsewhere in the act under
provisions merely forbidding sale after certain hours.
It is not intended here to embrace the thesis that there could
never be a proper basis for making out conflict by implication. The
point is that such an implication is not lightly to be drawn, that it
should be impelled as a matter of sound statutory interpretation
in the particular case. Otherwise, by a loose resort to the device,
the Sokol test might be enervated and home rule powers in the area
of police, sanitary and other similar regulation be considerably
weakened. It was frequently stated during the course of the de-
bates in the constitutional convention that Article XVIII was in-
tended to vest municipalities with all powers not denied, which was
the converse of the situation which had hitherto prevailed. Defeat
of these powers by conflict based on implication is not lightly to be
accepted.
The problem of conflict with general laws was involved in two
well-known nisi prius cases concerning the motion pictures, "The
Birth of a Nation" and "The Birth of a Baby." In Epoch Producing
Co. v. Davis"12 it was sought to enjoin the mayor of the city of
Cleveland from preventing the showing in that municipality of the
' City of Coshocton v. Saba, 55 Ohio App. 40, 8 N.E. 2d 572 (1936).
' 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E. 2d 279 (1939).
' 19 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 465, 62 Week. L. Bul. 225 (1916).
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movie "Birth of a Nation." The Board of Film Censorship had is-
sued to the owners of the rights in the film a certificate of censor-
ship stating that the film was of a moral, educational and harmless
character. The mayor claimed that, under a provision in the city
charter granting him full power and authority, as conservator of
the peace, to supervise the administration of the affairs of the
municipality and see that the ordinances were enforced, he was
exercising a valid home rule power in prohibiting the exhibition of
the picture in Cleveland, since the movie was calculated to excite
and create a breach of peace contrary to a city ordinance.
Former Section 871-46(3),111 General C0de, provided that "Only
such films as are, in the judgment and discretion of the Board of
Censors, of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character
shall be passed and approved by the board." The statute made it a
misdemeanor to exhibit an unapproved motion picture in Ohio.
Since the board had jurisdiction and since, as was clearly pro-
vided in the statute, the only method of review of the Board's ac-
tion was in the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court had no standing
to review the action of the board. The question was-did board
action control the mayor? Judge Foran concluded that it did. The
legislature, he thought, had placed the power of censorship in a
state body and thereby the power was "forbidden to municipalities
acting under home rule charters." He had no doubt that in the
absence of any state law in relation to censorship, a city acting
under a home rule charter could, byordinance, provide for cen-
soring plays and theatrical exhibitions. While the court was, thus,
employing a theory of state pre-emption, the result can be sus-
tained under the non-conflict clause. The mayor was trying to ban
an exhibition allowed by the state censors under a general law.
Twenty years later, a similar case, which arose in Cincinnati, was
determined on just that basis.1 4
An ordinance of the city of Cincinnati attempted to confer
upon the city manager the power to license exhibitions, amuse-
ments, and other forms of entertainment held in theaters, concert
halls, and similar places within the city. The ordinance further pro-
vided that "if at any time, in the opinion of said city manager, the
performance, entertainment or exhibition given in such place is-
immoral, indecent, or injurious to the public welfare or morals,
then the city manager stiall have the power to revoke said license."
" The Administrative Code abolished the Board of Censors of Motion
Picture Films which operated under the supervision of the Industrial Com-
mission and transferred its powers and functions to a division of film
censorship in the Department of Education. OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 154-6,
154-26, 154-47.
"'American Committee on Maternal Welfare v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio
L. Abs. 533, 11 Ohio Op. 366 (1938).
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The city manager was enjoined from stopping the showing of "The
Birth of a Baby." If it be assumed that the ordinance authorized
the action of the city manager, it would be in conflict with the
statute since it was a local police regulation which forbade what
the statute allowed, viz., the exhibition of the film.
Regulation of the business of exhibiting movies, which does
not amount in substance to a prohibition of exhibition, is another
matter. That a picture had been passed by the censors would
hardly preclude a municipality from setting a closing hour or ban-
ning Sunday movies. The supreme court has dismissed, as not in-
volving a debatable constitutional question, the appeal of a case
in which the court below had upheld the validity of a municipal or-
dinance which prohibited the showing of any motion pictures on
Sunday.115 Section 13049, General Code, prohibited the exhibition
of movies on Sunday in the forenoon. Nor would conflict appear to
be made out where the potential audience was cut down by an or-
dinance forbidding attendance by children, unless, perhaps, the
movie was one specially designed for children.
Control of Streets and Traffic
The Supreme Court assumed, in Froelich v. Cleveland,86 that
"the location, vacation, extension, widening, curbing, guttering,
paving, maintenance and control of streets" were powers of local
self-government. It proceeded to uphold a conviction under an or-
dinance which set a maximum weight of ten tons for loads carried
on city streets, although the ,maximum fixed by statute was twelve
tons. That was in 1919. By treating the ordinance as a matter of
administrative management instead of a local police regulation,
the court was able to disregard the question of the existence of a
"conflict" with general laws. The court was thinking of the city's
burden of constructing and maintaining streets.117 Heavy loads,
however, affect the security and freedom of traffic as well as the
physical condition of the street. Why, moreover, is a penal ordi-
nance aimed solely at the protection of the city's economic interest
in a public way not a local police regulation? Would not a measure
prohibiting the defacing of public buildings fall in that category?
If, on the other hand, "general laws" has to do with enactments of
general concern instead of general application, the ordinance might
yet prevail. As to this, the opinion seems to support both inter-
pretations all in one paragraph."8
One of the first cases to find that a local police regulation
Cambridge v. Elliott, 135 Ohio St. 576, 21 N.E. 2d 669 (1939).
99 Ohio St. 376, 384, 124 N.E. 212, 214 (1919).
17A clearer case is that where a municipality forbids the operation,
upon its streets, of vehicles equipped with cleats or spikes. Wilson v.
Springfield, 105 Ohio St. 647, 138 N.E. 927 (1922).
ul See 99 Ohio St. 376, 386, 124 N.E. 212, 215 (1919).
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governing speed of vehicles on the streets of the municipality was
a valid exercise of municipal power under Section 3, Article
XVIII, was City of Fremont v. Keating."1 9 In that case the defendant
appealed from a conviction under a city ordinance, which forbade
operation of a vehicle at a greater speed than eight miles per hour
in the business or closely built-up portions of the city, or fifteen
miles an hour in any other portion of the city. Section 12604, Gen-
eral Code, set the exact speed limitations contained in the ordi-
nance. Violation of the statute was punishable by fine and of the
ordinance by fine and imprisonment. Section 6307, General Code,
provided that local authorities should not regulate the speed of
motor vehicles by ordinance, by-law, or resolution. The conviction
was reversed on the ground that the defendant was entitled to
trial by jury since imprisonment might be part of the punishment-
Since he had not waived jury trial he was improperly convicted.
The court's treatment of the authority of the city to regulate
speed was significant, although not essential to the decision of the
case. It amounted to this: Section 3 of 'Article X=III directly
granted the power and the existence of state regulations did not
prevent its exercise so long as there was no conflict. The legislature
could not defeat it by simply forbidding its exercise. The statute
was not a regulation in itself but merely a limitation upon munici-
pal regulation. The speed regulations prescribed by the ordinance
were identical with those of the statute and, thus, there was no
conflict.
Speed regulations have since presented real "conflict" difficul-
ties. Schneidermann v. Sesanstein1 -2 0 was a civil action for personal
injuries resulting from the alleged negligent operation of a motor
vehicle upon the streets of the city of Akron by the defendant. The
accident occurred in a school zone. An ordinance of the city set a
speed limit of fifteen miles per hour for vehicles approaching a
school building during school hours. Section 12603, General Code,
made operation of a motor vehicle upon a road or highway at a
speed greater than was reasonable and proper a misdemeanor. A
rate of speed greater than fifteen miles an hour in the business or
closely built-up portions of a municipal corporation or more than
twenty-five miles an hour in other portions was made prima facie
evidence of a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper.
Section 12608, General Code, provided that "The provisions of se-
tion twelve thousand six hundred and three shall not be diminished,
restricted or prohibited by an ordinance, rule or regulation of a
municipality or other public authority."
96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929). The companion case of Eshner
v. City of Lakewood, 121 Ohio St. 106, 166 N.E. 904 (1929) is in accord.
Judges Day and Allen dissented in both cases.
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The court in finding that this was a local police regulation in
conflict with general laws relied primarily upon the theory of a
conflict by negative implication. Said the court, "when the law of
the state provides that a rate of speed greater than a rate therein
specified shall be unlawful, it is equivalent to stating that driving
at a less rate of speed shall not be a violation of law; and therefore
an ordinance of a municipality which attempts to make unlawful
a rate of speed which the state by general law has stamped as
lawful would be in conflict therewith." What clinched the matter,
however, was Section 12608. "A local regulation certainly is in
conflict with a general law covering the same subject if it attempts
to prohibit that which the statute has expressly provided shall not
be 'diminished, restricted or prohibited.' ,,121 Section 12608 was far
from clear. How could the "provisions" of a statute be diminished,
restricted or prohibited? The court thought the Section forbade
municipal regulation more drastic than that contained in the statute.
On that basis would the statute not be a limitation of municipal
home rule power rather than a true regulation, unless we are to
say flatly that there was a conflict because the effect of the statute
was to permit speeds over fifteen miles per hour where reasonable
and proper under the circumstances? Would Section 12608 be not
prohibitory implementation of state pre-emption of the field? Un-
der the potent pre-emption shield the state may enact legislation
on a particular matter and then say to the municipalities of Ohio,
"We have taken over the whole field; therefore, you are powerless
to enact legislation in the area." It is seriously doubted that the
framers of Section 3, Article XVIII, intended that municipal power
in matters of police, sanitary and similar regulations should be so
limited.
The problem in the Sesanstein case was somewhat alleviated
by the amending of Section 12603, General Code, to make it
"prima facie lawful" to drive at speeds not exceeding those
set forth in the statute. Then, in 1941, both 12603 and 12608
were repealed so that today it would seem that municipalities have
effective authority to enact speed regulations.
Schwartz v. Badil a12 2 arose after the amendments to Section
12603, but before the repeal of 12603 and 12608. In that case a city
ordinance tracked the specific limitations set up in the statute,
but added, "any speed which is inconsistent with the absolute
safety of pedestrians and other vehicular traffic by reason of
weather conditions, highway conditions, congestion of traffic, or any
cause whatsoever, shall be considered prima facie evidence of reck-
less driving."
Id. at 86-87, 167 N.E. at 160.
' 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.E. 2d 609 (1938).
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The court decided that this was a local police regulation in
conflict with general laws. Since, under the statute it was made
prima facie lawful to operate a motor vehicle at a speed not ex-
ceeding the rate specified and the ordinance made it prima facie
unlawful, conflict was considered obvious. There was a clash be-
tween the ordinance and statute only when the operator of a motor
vehicle drove within the statutory speed limits, which speed was
prima facie lawful, but in such a manner as to cause the speed to
be inconsistent with the absolute safety of pedestrians and other
vehicular tnffic which was prima facie unlawful under the ordi-
nance. In other words, it was -possible under certain circumstances
for the same rate of speed to be prima facie unlawful under the or-
dinance and prima facie lawful under the statute. Conflict was not
inevitable. The ordinance did not flatly prohibit anything that was
allowed by the statute. The most that could be held against the
ordinance was that it shifted the burden of going forward with
the evidence, or, perhaps, the burden of proof.
Especially interesting in a study of powers of Ohio munici-
palities are the cases dealing with regulation of the use of streets
by public carriers. The leading case upon this subject is Village of
Perrysburg v. Ridgway.123 An ordinance of the village prohibited
motor busses from starting or stopping within the municipal limits,
although the ordinance did not in any way prohibit the use of the
streets for through traffic. The case was a statutory taxpayer's suit
to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. The Supreme Court, by a
bare four-to-three vote, upheld the ordinance. The majority con-
sidered it a valid exercise of a power of local self-government. The
dissenters saw the measure as a police regulation which affected
the people and commerce of the state as a whole and which dis-
criminated arbitrarily against the village's own people. It must be
obvious that the exercise of home rule powers is-subject to such
constitutional limitations as the due process and equal protection
of the laws clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is going pretty far to say in the motor vehicle age that local
self-government carries to the point that a village may prevent
interurban common carriers from stopping their vehicles within
its limits. Judge Jones insisted in his Perrysburg dissent that the
majority's position was "a reversion to the ancient governmental
state, which existed within the walled cities in the Middle Ages."
Doubtless, the reason for the regulation was to avoid conges-
tion upon the streets and to safeguard the lives of the inhabitants
of the village against the stopping and starting of busses. Such
legislation falls in the category of local police regulation and, thus,
is subject to the limitation of conflict with general laws. Two
1108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 ('1923).
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years later, by a four-to-three vote, the court so classified an ordi-
nance of the city of Nelsonville, which prohibited the operation of
any motor busses on any street or avenue "on, or along or over
which street car or interurban cars are operated. '1 24 The suit was
one for an injunction to restrain enforcement of the ordinance. The
plaintiffs held a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by
the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to the authority granted
in Section 614-86, General Code, which provides, in part, that the
Commission shall have power "to supervise and regulate each
such motor transportation company ... to prescribe safety regula-
tions, and designate stops for service and safety on established
routes." The certificate fixed a bus route through the city. The
ordinance, while it did not entirely prohibit motor busses from the
use of the streets, so restricted the use of the thoroughfares of the
city that the busses were relegated to practically impassable streets.
The minority adhered to the local self-government thesis. The
majority, however, concluded not only that the police regulation
was unreasonable, but also that it was "beyond the letter and
spirit of Section 614-86, General Code." The Perrysburg case was
distinguished by pointing out that it was decided before Section
614-86 became effective and that it did not involve an absolute pro-
hibition of through traffic.
The Village of Bridgeport enacted an ordinance which marked
out the limits of the congested traffic distiict within the village and
limited passenger stops within that area by motor vehicles carry-
ing passengers for hire to designated stop zones. This measure was
upheld as applied to an interstate carrier which held a certificate
of convenience and necessity from the Public Utilities Commis-
sion.12 The certificate did not purport to designate passenger stops
in the village and, thus, there was no clash between it and the ordi-
nance. While the opinion is not entirely clear on the point, the court
seems to have regarded the ordinance as an exercise of a power of
local self-government. A municipal regulation of tr ffic looks more
like a local police regulation to the writers. This classification would
call for no difference in result because there was no conflict with
general law.
City of Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St. 217, 224, 148 N.E. 694, 696
(1925).
'Eastern Ohio Transport Corp. v. Bridgeport, 44 Ohio App. 433, 185
N.E. 891 (1932), petition in error dismissed for want of a debatable con-
stitutional question, 126 Ohio St. 238, 184 N.E. 852 (1933).
[Vol. 9
HOME RULE POWERS
Sylvania Busses, Inc. v. Toledo 10involved an ordinance of the
city of Toledo providing that it should be unlawful for anyone
operating an interurban motorbus over the streets of the munici-
pality to carry passengers for hire within the city limits, from one
point to another therein, except on such routes as the city should
designate and on which there was no community traction com-
pany service, either bus or street car. General Code Section 614-86
required that a motor carrier carrying passengets whose complete
rides were within one municipality or contiguous municipalities
have the consent of the muncipality or municipalities. The plain-
tiff motor transporation company, holding a certificate of conve-
nience and necessity from the Public Utilities.Commission, sought
an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance. The
ordinance was upheld but the court, did not find it necessary to
determine whether Article XVIII, Section 3, was alone sufficient
authority without benefit of the statute.
The opinions in these cases agreed that a certificate of con-
venience and necessity was a mere license and did not grant to
the carrier any property right in the streets of the municipality.
Thus, the various regulations of the municipalities did not take
away property rights, although the ordinances were still subject
to the rule that they must not be unreasonable or arbitrary. Local
situations demand local treatment and it should not be unduly dif-
ficult to effect a fair accommodation of local and wider interests in
traffic control.
Local licensing legislation of various types has given rise to
several interesting "home rule" decisions. In 1927 the Supreme
Court was faced with the question whether the city of Cincinnati,
in the absence of state legislation upon the subject, had authority
to require taxi drivers in the city to furnish insurance or bonds
indemnifying themselves against loss from negligent operation.127
A non-complying driver sought mandamus to compel the issuance
of a license. The court decided that the measure was a valid local
police regulation aimed at the protection of the members of the
general public in Cincinnati. There was no problem of conflict
since there was no general law upon the subject. It was contended
' 118 Ohio St. 187, 160 N.E. 674 (1928); accord, Murphy v. Toledo, 108
Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 626 (1923). A significant current method of traffic
regulation is the familiar parking meter. The employment of the device
is an exercise of the police power. There is power under Section 3, Ar-
ticle XVII, to resort to it. Hines v. City of Bellefontaine, 74 Ohio App.
393, 57 N.E. 2d 164 (1943).
--" State ex rel. McBride v. Deckebach, 117 Ohio St. 227, 157 N.E. 758(1927). An ordinance requiring that motor vehicles operated on the city
streets be inspected has been upheld, in the absence of conflicting state
regulation of the subject. Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E. 2d
617 (1937).
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by the relator that the ordinance had no relation to the public
safety since it merely provided for the collection of judgments ren-
dered against taxicab operators. The court rejected this argument,
stating that "Proper protection of the public is not limited to pre-
vention of injury. Proper public protection comprehends the taking
of measures to make whole members of the public who have suf-
fered injury, and in this broad and legitimate sense this measure
would fall within the police power if it applied only to remedies
for injury after the occurrence thereof.' 28
A Cleveland ordinance provided that no person under 18
should be permitted to operate an auto upon the streets of the
city, and that the owner of an auto should not permit a minor un-
der 18 to opeyate it upon the city streets. The owner of an auto-
mobile, who permitted his seventeen-year old stepson to operate it
in violation of the ordinance, was convicted of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor.1 2
The boy had a state driver's license. The statute set no age
minimum but Section 6296-10, General Code, then provided that
"The registrar shall not grant the application of any minor for an
operator's license unless such application" was signed by the proper
parent, guardian or other person having custody of such minor.
Section 6296-11 required an examination to be given before a minor
under 18 years of age could receive a license to operate a motor
vehicle in the state. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of conviction; the ordinance was a local police regulation in con-
flict with the state driver's license law and was, therefore, invalid.
The state license was accorded the effect of affirmatively permitting
the licensee to operate a motor vehicle in the state. Thus, Cleve-
land forbade what the General Assembly allowed.
The municipal establishment of safety zones for the safety of
pedestrians and persons boarding street cars and busses has been
recognized as a valid local police regulation where there was no
question of conflict with general law. 10O In the same category would
fall a requirement that a driver stop before entering a thoroughfare.
Heidle v. Baldwin'- was a personal injury action in which the
State ex Tel. McBride v. Deckeback, 117 Ohio St. 227, 233, 157 N.E.
758, 759 (1927). The suggestion made in the opinion that the indemnity
requirement had a direct tendency to make drivers more careful and, thus,
had an additional police power nexus, would certainly be difficult to docu-
ment as a matter of human experience. Plaintiff lawyers in negligence
cases would like nothing better than to give to juries a chance to draw
their own inferences from the requirement.
I Russo v. State, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 31 N.E. 2d 102 (Ohio App. 1938);
appeal dismissed for want of a debatable constitutional question, 134 Ohio
St. 510, 17 N.E. 2d 915 (1938).
228Cleveland v. Gustafson, 124 Ohio St. 607, 180 N.E. 59 (1932).
" 118 Ohio St. 375, 161 N.E. 44 (1928). -
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plaintiff relied upon an ordinance of the city of Piqua, which, af-
ter setting forth a definition of a thoroughfare in terms identical
with those contained in Section 6310-28 et seq., now 6307-2, General
Code, required drivers of motor vehicles to come to a full stop be-
fore entering upon a thoroughfare within the city limits. The code
merely gave "vehicles going on main thoroughfares" the right of
way over those going on intersecting thoroughfares. The city had
erected proper stop signs, and it was alleged that the defendant had
failed to observe such a sign, thereby causing an accident and
resulting injuries to the plaintiff. The validity of the ordinance was
not in issue. It was an additional regulation and was not questioned
as a valid exercise of the police power.
The charter of the city of East Cleveland provided that no
action should be brought against the city for personal injury, prop-
erty damage or wrongful death arising or sustained on the streets,
avenues, sidewalks, public grounds and other public spaces of the
city without first filing with the city commission within 30 days
from the time of the alleged injury, damage or wrongful death a
statement setting forth the time, place and manner in which it
occurred. Failure to file such statement would be deemed a waiver
of the cause of action. General Code Section 3714 requires munici-
palities to keep streets and other public ways open, in repair and
free from nuisance. The plaintiff in a personal injury action against
the city had not conformed to the charter provision. The provision
was declared invalid because it attempted to qualify a duty im-
posed by general law. 112 All roads throughout the staten including
streets established, improved, and maintained by a municipality
at its expense, are public highways of the state. The state may, by
general law, devolve control upon local subdivisions and impose
duties upon them with respect thereto. That devolution involves
use of the local unit to exercise a state power. Thus,. the state alone
may relieve the local unit of a duty imposed with reference to
streets. That, in brief, is the rationalization supporting the de-
cision.
As for Section 3, Article XVIII, the court said:
"The difference between a municipality imposing a
condition precedent to the attachment of liability for a
breach of duty imposed by general law and wholly refus-
ing to assume such a duty and consequent liability for its
breach is one of degree only, and requires the existence
and exercise of the same character of power, a police power
of its own, superior to the exercised police power of the
state, a power which is expressly not granted' to munici--
palities by the Constitution of Ohio. '1 33
'Wilson v. East Cleveland, 121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929).
= Id. at 256-257, 167 NE. at 893.
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It will be remembered that in earlier cases, conspicuously the
Froelich3 and Perrysburg'3 5 cases, it had been broadly declared
that the power to establish, open, improve, maintain and repair
public streets within the municipality, and fully control the use
of them, was embraced within the grant of all "powers of local
self-government." The opinion in the Wilson case cites no cases. It
was rested upon general principles and upon them alone.130
Nor is it perspicuously clear that the ordinance was in conflict
with the statute. The ordinance did not attempt to make the city
immune. It merely set up a procedural requirement affecting as-
sertion of a claim. The obvious design of such a provision is to put
the city on notice early so that it may be in a satisfactory position
to make an investigation and prepare its defense while the event
is fresh and witnesses are available. Whether thirty days consti-
tuted too short a span for filing the requisite statement was quite
another matter; assuming the existence of municipal power, its
exercise must be reasonable.
What the decision adds up to is that the state can require our
home rule municipalities to maintain their public ways in good re-
pair and support the requirement by a civil sanction of liability
in damages not subject to material municipal regulation even as
to procedure. While it is unfortunate that the opinion did not refer
to the earlier cases and that it is couched in such broad language,
it must be granted that there is more than a strictly local interest
in the maintenance of public ways in safe condition. This is the
more apparent in these times of highly fluid automotive traffic. The
sanction of civil liability, moreover, carries us over into what may
appropriately be called the domain of private law. Law-making in
the area of civil relationships, whether we speak of torts, contracts,
or what not, is a power our legislatures have not been wont to de-
volve upon local bodies and it may seriously be doubted that the
Home Rule Amendment should be interpreted to effect such de-
volution.138
In 1919 the Supreme Court laid it down obiter, but unequivo-
cally, that the vacation of a street is a power of local self-govern-
ment.1s8 In addition to vacation by council action the municipal
'Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
'Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595
(1923).
'The Perrysburg case related to physical movement over the village
streets. That suggests a possible basis of distinction, but we lay little store
by it since a statute imposing a duty to repair is actually concerned with
the use of streets.
" The subject is discussed more fully elsewhere in this issue of the
Journal. Comment, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 152 (1948).
11 See Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212, 214 (1919).
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code provides an independent method under which a private land-
owner may proceed in the court of common pleas to have a street
or alley vacated.130 In a judicial vacation proceeding any owner of
property in the immediate vicinity may ask damages and the court
may render judgment against the petitioners for damages as it may
deem just. The Cincinnati charter required planning commission
approval of a proposed vacation subject to power in the council to
override the commission by two-thirds vote. Cincinnati contested
a judicial vacation proceeding on the ground that vacation is a
matter of local self-government and the charter had riot been
complied with. In a per curiam opinion, void of case citations, the
court took the position that the statute did not clash with the char-
ter because it furnished lot owners a means of redress in a street
vacation, a field of legislation not occupied by the charter.14 0 It was
stated simply that the city charter provisions were not intended
to supersede the statute. JSudge Allen dissented upon the ground
that the code provision infringed upon the home rule power of
local self-government.
It is obvious that city planning will be hampered if streets
may be vacated without regard to developed, plans and without the
concurrence of those officially charged with preserving the integ-
rity of plans. The case does not deny municipal power in the
premises. A charter provision could be so drawn as to remove any
doubt that all street vacations were subject to the requirement of
planning commission approval. That would present the issue
squarely.
Public Health and Welfare
In the section upon governmental structure we discussed the
subject of health departments. It was seen that they are considered
matters of state-wide concern, and, as such, are subject to state
control. It was pointed out, however, that the court had doubtless
not gone so far as to say that health protection was so completely
in an area of exclusive state jurisdiction that municipalities could
not act although the legislature had not attempted to place the
responsibility in other hands.
Most regulations having to do with public health fall within
the second grant of power in Section 3, Article XVIII, as local
police, sanitary or similar regulations. We traditionally class legis-
lation having to do with public health, safety and morals as
within the police power of the particular governmental unit. The
Ohio courts have been quite consistent in following this pattern.
In Dayton v. Jacobs'4' it was held that it was within the police
'Onto GEN. CODE §3725 (council action), §3730 (judicial action).
"' Cincinnati v. Wess, 127 Ohio St. 99, 186 N.E. 855 (1933).
'- 120 Ohio St. 225, 165 N.E. 844 (1929).
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power of a municipality, under Section 3 of Article XVIII, to pro-
hibit the sale or exposure for sale of diseased and unwholesome
meat within its territory, and, for the accomplishment of uch
purpose, to provide that, before any meat be sold or offered for
sale, it be inspected and approved by a duly constituted officer of
the municipality, according to a standard established by such
municipality. Such a measure was clearly a public health regula-
tion, and, in the absence of conflict with general law, was allowed
to stand as a valid enactment.
Springfield v. Hurst14 2 involved the validity of an ordinance of
the city of Springfield which provided that no one engaged in or
connected with the sale of eyeglasses, ophthalmic lenses, eyeglass
frames and mountings, should include in any advertisement by
newspaper or other means "any statement advertising the price of
lenses, or of complete eyeglasses, including lenses, either with or
without professional services or credit terms, installment pay-
ments or price plans, or the price of any frames or mountings, un-
less in conjunction therewith the words, 'without lenses,' appear
in such manner as to be clearly discernible, or read in such manner
as to be clearly understood." The only pertinent statute is Section
1295-31, General Code, which provides, in part, that the State Board
of Optometry may revoke, suspend or cancel the certificate of any
optometrist found "guilty of fraudulently advertising a price of
spectacles or eyeglasses, by cards, circulars, statements or other-
wise, with intent to deceive or mislead the public."
The court held that the ordinance was a local police regula-
tion which did not conflict with general laws and which had a
substantial relation to public health since it would tend to dis-
courage cut-throat competition, which, in turn, often gives rise to
poor quality and poor grinding of lenses in order to allow the ar-
ticles to be sold at a low advertised price. Three judges dissented
on the score of reasonableness.
It is significant that there was no suggestion in the opinions
that health protection is a matter of state-wide concern. Perhaps
it was thought that the state did not intend to take over the whole
field of optometry, including the sale of eyeglasses. Certainly it is
plain that the case is not consistent with any idea that health pro-
tection is an area of exclusive state jurisdiction.
Examples of the adoption of local police regulations to cover
specific problems in the community are, of course, numerous. An
ordinance setting one pound as the standard weight of any loaf of
bread to be sold in the city, but allowing heavier loaves to be sold
if properly labeled, has been upheld as a valid exercise of local
police power in the absence of any general law in force upon the
14 144 Ohio St. 49, 56 N.E. 2d 185 (1944).
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subject at that time.143 Home rule power includes enactment of
local police regulations designed to prevent fraud and imposition
as well as to preserve life, health, good order and decency.
In Greenberg v. Cleveland1" an ordinance which made at-
tempts to steal and take anything from the person of another by
violence, force or putting in fear, a misdemeanor, was upheld.
Pocket-picking -was made an offense by statute but attempts were
not covered. The court did not rest simply upon the absence of
conflict. It was broadly laid down that a statute creating the same
offense as the ordinance could not be exclusive even if the legis-
lature expressly forbade municipal legislation on the subject.
A municipal ordinance proscribing the sale or offers for sale
of papers, periodicals or other publications containing horse racing
news or tips has been upheld as a valid exercise of police power.'"
Again no general law was cited to bring up the problem of con-
flict. The fact that such publications as were covered by the ordi-
nance tended to incite gambling or betting on horse races made
them a proper subject for police regulation and overrode the ar-
gument of the defendant that the ordinance violated freedom of
speech and press. Municipal proscription of slot machines the re-
turn from which is governed by chance is, likewise, within the
home rule grant.1"
To prevent fraud in the auctioning of jewelry, a municipal or-
dinance of the city of Cleveland provided that no jewelry should
be sold at auction in the city for a greater period than sixty days
in one year and that an auctioneer of jewelry must have been a
resident of the city for one year and have had a regular stock of
jewelry for six months of that year. General Code Section 5868
provided for the state licensing of persons to sell goods (in general)
at auction for one year. A licensee under the statute sought to en-
join enforcement of the ordinance.147 The ordinance wiihstood his
attack. The local police power was considered broad enough to
ground measures directed to the financial as well as the physical
safety of the public. There was no conflict, moreover, with Section
5868, General Code, since the statute was a general measure which
" Allion v. Toledo, 99 Ohio St. 416, 124 N.E. 237 (1919).
"98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918).
"Solomon v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 19, 159 N.E. 121 (1926).
... Myers v. Cincinnati, 128 Ohio St. 235, 190 N.E. 569 (1934); Zelles v.
Matowitz, 22 Ohio Op. 261 (Ohio App. 1941), appeal dismissed for want of
a debatable constitutional question, 139 Ohio St. 627, 49 N.E. 2d 945 (1942).
A slot machine may be treated as a gambling device per se even though
designed for lawful operation. If banned by general law, an ordinance
authorizing the licensing of such a machine will not stand up. Kraus v.
Cleveland 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E. 2d 159 (1939).
"'Holsman v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925).
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did not specifically govern sales of particular classes of goods at
auction.
In 1935, by a five-to-two vote, the Supreme Court sustained a
Zanesville ordinance regulating the hours during which a barber
shop could remain open as a valid exercise of the police power under
Section 3 of Article XVIII, since barber shops are closely connected
with the public health and safety. 4 8 There was no general law regu-
lating barber shop hours. Eight years later a similar Cincinnati or-
dinance was invalidated and the Zanesville case was squarely over-
ruled."' 9 This time the vote was four to three. Section 34 of Article
II of the Constitution authorizes "laws" fixing and regulating the
hours of labor. None of the judges in either case questioned the
proposition that "laws" meant enactments of the legislature and
did not embrace municipal ordinances. The question was whether
the ordinances were valid exercises of power under the second
grant of Section 3 of Article XVIII. It is a fair guess that the or-
dinances in both cases were sponsored by regular day-time bar-
bers who wanted to eliminate competition by chain or other shops
operated at night. The majority in the Zanesville case thought that
the ordinance was valid viewed in terms either of its relation to
the health and welfare of those served by barbers or of its rela-
tion to the welfar6 of the barbers themselves. They thought there
was substance to the idea that the ordinance was really a regula-
tion of working hours, that "fixing the hours the shop shall remain
open may be to the legislative mind the only effective way to
regulate hours of labor in this trade." The dissenters insisted that
the ordinance was arbitrary, in any event, but that, were it to be
deemed a regulation of hours of labor, it would be invalid because
the legislature is given exclusive authority over that subject by
Section 34 of Article II. Judge Jones assumed that an hour-fixing
measure was not an exercise of police power. This assumption was
also made in the majority opinion in the Cincinndti case. Judge
Bell declared there that the ordinance served no other purpose
than the fixing of working hours."'
A very persuasive argument can be made that the ordinances
in these cases were essentially regulations of hours of labor and
that the constitution gave the General Assembly exclusive legis-
lative jurisdiction in that area. It does not help, however, to say
that such regulation is not an exercise of police power. The con-
trary appears to be true beyond serious argument. The point is
that state authority in this area of the police power is considered
exclusive because of the specific grant of power in the constitution.
' Wilson v. Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N.E. 187 (1935).
" Cincinnati v. Cirrell, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E. 2d 412 (1943).
'Id. at 543, 49 N.E. 2d at 416.
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Child welfare was treated in Ferrie v. Sweeney,15 ' a nisi prius
case, as a matter of state-wide concern and an ordinance of the
city of Cleveland which appropriated money to support day care
centers for children of working mothers without regard to financial
need was held invalid. The'court held that the legislature in en-
acting Sections 3070-1 to 3070-35, inclusive, General Code, setting
up county child welfare boards throughout the state and defining
their power and duties, "has clearly evidenced its intention to oc-
cupy the entire field of child welfare." This sounds like pre-emption
and, if so, the field would be closed to the municipalities. The court
held that the matter was not a power of local self-government and
that the ordinance was contrary to the spirit and purpose of the
child welfare act, since it proposed to give aid to children indis-
criminately while the state laws set up the requirement of need
as a prerequisite to assistance.
Thus, in the matter of public health and welfare, the cases
seem to boil down to the proposition that where the state has set
up some machinery for governing the problem, such as health dis-
tricts and the child welfare boards, the subject is a state-wide
concern and lies beyond municipal power. But where the state has
set up no such machinery and the problem is deemed appropriate
for municipal action, they will look to the second grant of power in
Section 3, Article XVIII, and treat the local measure as a local
police, sanitary or other similar regulation.
Perhaps, the correct theory is that the municipalities may act
until the state pre-empts the field. Yet, it seems that pre-emption
could be accomplished short of the establishment of health dis-
tricts, departments and boards. It may be doubted that health and
welfare measures are purely state affairs, whatever that may be.
Would it not, therefore, be a strongly supportable position to say
here that the "conflicts" test of Section 3, Article XVIII, is the true
guide? The state could control any matter of public health by
enacting proper legislation thereon, while municipalities could sup-
plement the statutes with local legislation to meet their own prob-
lems. The state law would, in effect, set up the minimum require-
ments, while local legislation could be directed at the special
phases of health protection which prevail within the municipal
limits.
Planning and Zoning
Comprehensive urban zoning was sustained by Ohio's highest
court in Pritz v. Messer's' a year before it successfully met the
constitutional test in the Supreme Court of the United States in
the famous Ohio-born case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E. 2d 128 (1946).
"'112 Ohio St. 628, '149 N.E. 30 (1925).
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Co.'53 The Ohio court concluded that the ordinance before it was
a valid exercise of the police power. The opinion, however, de-
scribed zoning as "a function of local self-government." Since there
was an enabling statute, 154 which granted zoning powers to munici-
palities, the point was made that a municipality is "doubly em-
powered" to legislate on the subject. If there is power to zone
flowing directly through the constitution to a municipality, it is not
evident what a statute can add. It would appear, moreover, that
since zoning is pretty clearly an exercise of police power it falls
within the second grant of Section 3 of Article XVIII 1'
Perhaps the Pritz case is sufficient explanation for the opinion
in a recent Court of Appeals case in which a zoning ordinance pre-
vailed over a State Board of Liquor Control permit to manufacture
wine in a residence zone.15 The majority stressed the prior enact-
ment of the ordinance and declared that the city's authority to
zone was at least commensurate with the power of the Board to
issue the permit. The dissenting judge perceived a square conflict
and concluded that the Liquor Control Act, under which the per-
mit was issued, overrode the local police regulation.
Planning is a function of local self-government and a home rule
charter may make appropriate provision for a planning commis-
4ign and otherwise for the conduct of planning activities.1
5 7
Schools and Libraries
It is well settled in Ohio that the control and maintenance of
our common schools rests exclusively in the General Assembly.
The leading case upon this subject for present purposes, is Niehaus
v. State ex rel. Board of Education.158 In that case the building
inspector of the city of Dayton refused to issue a building permit
to the board of education of the city school district because the
board had not paid a fee required by an ordinance governing the
issuance of such permits. The board of education relied upon Sec-
tions 1031 and 1035, General Code, which provide that the chief
inspector of workshops shall cause to be inspected all school houses
to determine the safety of construction and health facilities, and
that after such inspection, if satisfactory, "the plans for the erec-
tion of such structure . . .shall be approved by the inspectors of
workshops and factories, except in municipalities having regularly
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
OHIO GEN. CODE §4366-1 et seq.
0'It was so classified in Bauman v. State ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio
St. 269, 171 N.E. 336 (1930).
Carnabuci v. City of Norwalk, 70 Ohio App. 429, 46 N.E. 2d 773
(1942).
State ex rel. Bateman v. Zachritz, 135 Ohio St. 580, 22 N.E. 2d 84
(1939).
" 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924).
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organized building inspection departments, in which case the plans
shall be approved by such department." The city of Dayton had
established a building inspection department.
The court determined that the fee could not be exacted since
"The only constitutional concession of power to municipalities with
reference to public schools is a provision that municipalities that
have attained to the classification of a city shall have power to
determine by a referendum vote the number of members of the
school board of the district situated wholly or partly within the
city."150 As to all other power, including the power of a munici-
pality to approve plans for the erection of a public school building,
the legislature has exclusive authority and municipalities have only
such power as is granted to them by the legislature. Since the
legislature granted only the power to approve the plans for the
erection of a school building and did not grant the power to impose
a fee for the performance of that duty, the municipality was with-
out authority to establish such a requirement.
The source of the state's power as to schools is Section 7',
Article I, and Sections 2 and 3, Article VI, of the constitution.
Section 7, Article I, provides that, "it shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to pass suitable laws ... to encourage schools
and the means of instruction." Section 2, Article VI, ordains that
the General Assembly shall make adequate tax provision to secure
a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the
state. Section 3, Article VI, reads in part: "Provision shall be
made by law for the organization, administration and control of
the public school system of the state supported by public funds."
From these provisions it is fairly evident that public education lies
in an area of state jurisdiction beyond the reach of home rule
powers.10
The charter of Columbus made provision for free public li-
braries to be administered by a board of trustees to be appointed
by the mayor. The board was authorized to operate the public
library system and to extend it. There was no limitation upon
extension inconsistent with provision of library service to in-
habitants of the county residing beyond the city limits. By statute
a municipal public library board could participate in certain classi-
fied property taxes collected by the county on condition that it
ld. at 54, 144 N.E. at 435.
'Conversely, however, state control over schools does not permit in-
vasion of the home rule domain. Thus, the Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional a statutory provision for free water from a municipal
waterworks for the public schools. The statute clashed with ,Section 4,
Article XVIII, of the constitution, Board .of Education of City School Dis-
trict of Columbus v. City of Columbus, 118 Ohio St. 295, 160 N.E. 902 (1928).
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extended service to people in the county living outside the munici-
pality. The Columbus board took steps to qualify under the act.
In mandamus to compel the county treasurer to honor a warrant
drawing on the board's asserted share of the funds available under
the act it was held that the statute applied and the writ was
allowed.'6 ' The question whether by home rule charter provision
the state could be barred from employing a municipal library to
serve people in the rest of the county was posed in the opinion
but left unanswered since the statutory scheme was consistent
with the Columbus Charter. The educational character of free
public libraries was noted, however, and it is a fair guess that were
the posed question fairly presented the charter provision would
give way. The state-concern concept could very easily be employed
here.
Sanctions
Section 3628, General Code, empowers municipalities "to make
the violation of ordinances a misdemeanor, and to provide for the
punishment thereof by fine or imprisonment, or both, but such fine
shall not exceed five hundred dollars and such imprisonment shall
not exceed six months." It antedates the Home Rule Amendment.
A strong dictum from the pen of Chief Justice Marshall put aside
the limitations of the section as ineffective restraints upon local
police power.162 The non-conflict clause did not apply because it
has reference to conflict with a general law prescribing a rule of
conduct on the same subject matter as a local measure. A limita-
tion on municipal law-making is not such a general law. If "con-
flict" could be created by statutory prohibition of or limitation upon
the adoption of municipal police regulations, the legislature could,
by a simple "no," destroy the second grant of power under Section
3 of Article XVIII.
How far does municipal freedom in prescribing penal sanctions
go? We do not know of any principle to provide clear guidance in
drawing a line. While it can be asserted with safety that a munici-
pality does not have home rule power to define and punish serious
crimes, such as arson and murder, the felony concept does not solve
our problem because an offense may be punishable by a very heavy
fine and yet not be a felony. There are, however, the broad limita-
tions of appropriateness and reasonableness. There must, we take
it, be a rational nexus between the regulation or prohibition and
municipal functions and objectives. A penalty, moreover, which
was entirely out of line with the offense would be subject to the
charge of arbitrariness.
' State ex Tel. Brickell v. Frank, 129 Ohio St. 604, 196 N.E. 416 (1935).
" See Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 346, 168 N.E. 844, 845
(1929).
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Territorial Changes, Merger, Consolidation and Dissolution
The village of Brook Park sought to enjoin completion of pro-
-ceedings under general law to detach some of its territory and
annex it to the contiguous city of Cleveland. The village relied,
in part, upon the ground that the proceeding invaded its home
rule powers. The Common Pleas Court rejected this contention.
Judge Orr observed that there must be some method of effecting
territorial changes and labeled the subject a state-wide concern.63
That was in 1943. The writers have found no other Ohio case bear-
ing even mention of the question.
The whole province of annexation, disannexation, merger, con-
solidation and dissolution doubtless lies beyond the reach of home
rule powers. The Home Rule Amendment is silent as to all of these
matters. All but dissolution involve elements which transcend a
particular municipality.
Provision for original incorporation is expressly left in state
hands. Is not the question whether municipal existence will be
continued also under state control? Home rule powers are granted
to municipalities. It would seem that they presuppose continued
existence and do not embrace self-destruction.
Extraterritoriality
Extraterritorial powers with respect to the acquisition and
operation of municipal utilities are expressly granted by Sections 4
and 6 of Article XVIII. 16 4 Section 3, on the other hand, grants (1)
all powers of local self-government without specific reference to
the territorial factor and (2) power to adopt and enforce "within
their limits" local police, and the like, regulations. Were the ques-
tion presented we have no doubt but that it would be decided that
a municipality could not directly cross its corporate limits under
either grant. This means that extraterritorial powers depend upon
legislative devolution. Does the Home Rule Amendment itself
limit the General Assembly in any wise in delegating such powers?
Certainly there is nothing in the first grant of Section 3 to suggest
any limitation. As to the second there is a decision of the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington which has disturbing implica-
tions. Section 11 of Article XI of the constitution of that state has
a clause like the second grant of Section 3 of Ohio's Article XVIII.
The Washington court decided that the words "within its limits"
was an all-embracing limitation which precluded the legislature
from devolving upon a municipality extraterritorial police power
with respect to protection of a water supply.105 As the writers see
'Village of Brook Park v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio Op. 536 (1943).
' Home rule powers in relation to utilities are discussed elsewhere in
this issue of the Journal. See Comment, 9 OHo ST. L.J. 141 (1948).
'Brown v. Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 Pac. 112 (1927).. Fullerton, J.,
dissented.
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the problem, the quoted words merely mark the bounds of the
direct constitutional grant of power; they do not refer to the powers
of the legislature, to its broad responsibility so to distribute au-
thority within the constitutional framework as to get the business
of government done. Ohio should not look with favor upon the
Washington interpretation.
Functional Consolidation
What has been said concerning extraterritoriality is pertinent
here. The County Home Rule Amendment covers the subject in
small part;,"" otherwise the matter appears to depend upon enabling
legislation. CONCLUSION
The experience of Ohio with municipal home rule has been a
rather unhappy business.
The Home Rule Amendment was not well-conceived in the
first place. There is ample evidence in the Proceedings and De-
bates of the Constitutional Convention that much confusion existed
in the minds of the delegates. When they did not clearly tie the
availability of substantive home rule powers to the adjective pro-
cess of charter-making they left a mass of legal problems in their
wake. They did not give a municipality a clean choice between
operating under general law and on a home rule footing. While
the real crux of the home rule problem is the larger municipalities,
home rule powers were granted to all cities and villages without
regard to size. The grant of "all powers of local self-government"
was just as vague and difficult to apply as the much-criticized
California provision with respect to "municipal affairs." A rigid
city-village classification borrowed from the Municipal Code of 1902
was frozen into the organic law.
We have met with something less than indifferent success in
applying the Home Rule Amendment. This is due in part to the
inherent difficulty of the task and in part to public apathy and the
inadequacy of the efforts of the bar in handling home rule questions
in the courts. Local responsibility for the conduct of public affairs
at the local level is a fundamental political value in the American
scheme of things. Home rule has been employed to assure munici-
palities this responsibility free from legislative interference, on the
'"OHIO CONST. Art. X, §§ 1, 3 and 4.
The Attorney General has ruled that a municipality has home rule
power to provide supervision for recreational activities by a cooperative
agreement with the local board of education. 1945 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio)
No. 253, p. 245.
In the area of federal-local relations he has found authority in Section
3, Article XVIII, for a municipal agreement with the Federal Government
under which the latter was to provide emergency post-war housing for
veterans and the city to provide certain facilities and manage the project.
(1946) Ops. ATr'Y Gm. (Ohio) No. 932, p. 311.
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one hand, and from the necessity for seeking all their authority
from the legislature, on the other. The difficulty has been that we
have used a -vague political concept as a formula for distributing
power between the state and municipalities and have distributed
governmental power on the basis of a. very artificial geographical
pattern. This rigidity has been at the expense of highly desirable
flexibility and adaptability in governmental arrangements. Urban
growth is outward. While population in the older parts of- many
cities is actually on the decline, our cities have,- in social and eco-
nomic fact, swarmed over their boundaries. Home rule, as we have
known it in Ohio, stops at the corporate limits, yet community
development is taking place in the vital urban fringe. Municipal
power,, then, stops at a line which has little relation to the true
scope of urban problems. Nor does home rule, as presently cor-
ceived, contribute to the adjustment of our complex problems of
intergovernmental relationships.
Vagaries in judicial interpretation of the Home Rule Amend-
ment lie as, much at the door of the bar as that of the courts. Local
Government Law is a subject which has far from attracted maxi-
mum lawyer interest. Perhaps the law schools are really ultimately
at fault for not having given this important subject the attention
it merits.
There will, of course, be an opportunity in 1952 to reopen the
whole subject of home rule and state-local relations. It is hoped
that the electors will decide at that time in favor of calling a con-
vention,, under Section 3, Article XVI of the Ohio Constitution, to
revise, alter or amend that instrument. If so, home rule should be
thoroughly re-examined on a sweeping local government context
not confined to municipalities. If the people and the delegates do
not trust the General Assembly to preserve local autonomy, the
constitutional scheme developed to achieve that end should some-
how be made to assure sufficient flexibility to enable us to get the
over-all job of government in Ohio done well by effective use of
the powers and governmental machinery available.
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